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PURSUING SETTLEMENT IN AN ADVERSARY
CULTURE: A TALE OF INNOVATION CO-OPTED OR
"THE LAW OF ADR"
CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW*

I.

INTRODUCTION

N this Article I tell a tale of legal innovation co-opted. Put another
way, this is a story of the persistence and strength of our adversary
system in the face of attempts to change and reform some legal institutions and practices.' In sociological terms, it is an ironic tale of the
unintended consequences of social change and legal reform. A field
that was developed, in part, to release us from some-if not all-of
the limitations and rigidities of law and formal legal institutions has
now developed a law of its own. With burgeoning developments in the
use of nonadjudicative methods 2 of dispute resolution in the courts
* Professor of Law, UCLA Law School; Acting Co-Director, Center for the Study of
Women, UCLA; A.B., 1971, Barnard College; J.D., 1974, University of Pennsylvania. This
Article is based on the Mason Ladd Memorial Lecture delivered at Florida State University College of Law on February 15, 1990. Earlier versions were presented at the Federal Judicial Center,
September 16, 1988, at the AALS Workshop on Alternative Dispute Resolution, July 8, 1989, at
a faculty colloquium at UCLA, and as a Lansdowne Lecture to a faculty colloquium at the
University of Victoria Faculty of Law in the fall of 1989. 1 thank participants at those sessions
for insightful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Lucie White, Robert Meadow, Stephen Yeazell, and Jon Johnsen for particularly close and helpful readings, and to Greg Zipes,
Ann Schneider, and Jonathan Frenkel for research assistance.
I also would like to express my appreciation to my hosts (both faculty and students) and Law
Review editors at the Florida State University College of Law, whose company and patience I
have enjoyed for two years in a row.
I. The attempts at innovation discussed in this Article are responsive to a wide range of
criticisms about the legal system and its practices, from the "caseload explosion," see, e.g.,
Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83 (1976); Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 767 (1977), to discovery abuse, see
Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31
VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978), to the behavior of lawyers, see Adams, The Legal Profession: A
Critical Evaluation, 74 JUDICATURE 77 (1990), to the quality of resolution of legal disputes,
whether in the context of adjudication or private settlement, see, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Toward
Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754
(1984); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
2. Terminology and categorization are very problematic in this field. I use the term "nonadjudicative" methods to distinguish them from the "ideal type" of court trial, but in fact many
ADR methods are adjudicatory-such as arbitration, so-called "med-arb," and other hybrid
variations on these primary themes. See generally S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DisPUTE RESOLUTION (1985).
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and elsewhere, 3 issues about alternative dispute resolution (ADR) increasingly have been "taken to court." As a result, we are beginning
to see the development of case and statutory law and, dare I say, a
"common law" or "jurisprudence" of ADR.
In this Article, I review some of the conflicting impulses and purposes behind the ADR movement and trace how that movement has
been affected by some of the legitimacy handed to it by its assimilation into the court system. I review a few of the recent cases that have
begun to explore the legal issues implicated by the use of alternative
methods of dispute resolution. 4 My purpose is not to review the case
law for doctrinal understanding, but to try to unravel and understand
the processes of institutional and social change and legal reform. In
the case of ADR, different themes of emphasis have been differentially heard and some goals have been advanced over others. Thus, in
a bigger and more political sense, this is a tale of how power and control are asserted in the legal system, how competing values and
counter-cultural challenges are interpreted, controlled, and assimilated
within powerful cultural constructs.
For me personally, it is the continuation of a story that informs my
scholarly and teaching life-how the "ideal type" of adversarial litigation structures, and frequently distorts, the processes and outcomes
of good legal solutions. In earlier work, I have explored how lawyer
behavior modeled on adversary practices may distort the achievement
of good negotiated settlements5 and how judicial settlement conduct
may or may not facilitate quality solutions to legal problems.6 In this
Article, I explore the larger institutional issues presented when lawyers, judges, and parties to a conflict come together to resolve dis-

3. Like many others who write about alternative dispute resolution (ADR), in this Article I
separate the "public" uses of ADR within the court system (here mostly federal) from the private arena. Some of the issues apply to both arenas and many critics are concerned with the
blurring of the two. See generally Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1987); Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Resnik,
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 494 (1986). 1 share some
of the concerns about the "privatization" of the dispute resolution mechanisms in our society,
see infra notes 124-55 and accompanying text; see generally Garth, Privatization and the New
Formalism: Making Courts Safe for Bureaucracy, 13 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 157 (1988), but I will
leave some of these issues for exploration at a later date. Whatever the pitfalls of some private
dispute resolution systems, parties have always been free, within certain limits, to devise and use
their own forms of dispute resolution in our party-initiated legal complaint system.
4. In this context, "alternative" refers to methods of handling disputes through means
other than the adversarial trial method.
5. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note i.
6. See Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: The Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 488 (1985).
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putes using new forms within old structures. As a proponent of a
particular version of ADR-the pursuit of "quality" solutions-I am
somewhat troubled by how a critical challenge to the status quo has
been blunted, indeed co-opted, by the very forces I had hoped would
be changed by some ADR forms and practices. In short, courts try to
use various forms of ADR to reduce caseloads and increase court efficiency at the possible cost of realizing better justice. Lawyers may use
ADR not for the accomplishment of a "better" result, but as another
weapon in the adversarial arsenal to manipulate time, methods of discovery, and rules of procedure for perceived client advantage. Legal
challenges cause ADR "issues" to be decided by courts. An important
question that must be confronted is whether forcing ADR to adapt to
a legal culture or environment may be counterproductive to the transformations proponents of ADR would like to see in our disputing
practices.
The issues which are implicated in this inquiry are jurisprudentially
important. These issues extend well beyond the current scholarly and
professional debates about ADR and settlement. 7 The issues are those

7. For critiques of some of the ADR developments, see generally I THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (R. Abel ed. 1982) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE]; 2 THE PoLITcs OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES (R. Abel ed. 1982); C.
HARRINOTON,

SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO

COURT (1985); Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and
the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1986); Brunet,

supra note 3; Coleman & Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POLICY 102 (Autumn
1986); Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359; Eisele, The Case Against
Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR Programs, 75 JUDICATURE 34 (1991); Edelman, Institutionalizing Dispute Resolution Alternatives, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 134 (1984); Edwards, supra note 3; Fineman, Dominant Discourse: Professional Language and Legal Change in Child Custody Decision
Making, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988); Fiss, supra note 3; Galanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988 J. DISPUTrE RESOLUTION 55; Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Guill & Slavin, Rush to Unfairness: The Downside of ADR,
28 JUDGE'S J. 8 (Summer 1989); Hay, Carnevale & Sinicropi, Professionalization: Selected Ethical Issues in Dispute Resolution, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 228 (1984); Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse
Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
57 (1984); Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 DEN. U.L. REV. 381 (1989); McMunigal, The Costs
of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV.
833 (1990); Nader, Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L. J. 998 (1979); Nader, The
Recurrent Dialectic Between Legality and its Alternatives: The Limits of Binary Thinking, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 621 (1984); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982); Rifkin,
Mediation From a Feminist Perspective: Promise and Problems, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 21 (1984);
Silbey & Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From Institutional Critique to
the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject, 66 DEN. U.L. REV. 437 (1989); White, The Pros and
Cons of Getting to Yes (Book Review), 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 115 (1984); Woods, Mediation: A
Backlash to Women: Progress on Family Law Issues, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 31 (1985); Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
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which have informed the value debates about our systems of
procedure" since we, as an Anglo-American system of law, have developed our forms and processes of justice.9 Thus, the debates about
ADR and the legal resolutions of important policy and procedural issues affect not only ADR, but the legitimacy of the entire legal process. As the issues raised about ADR begin to wind their way through
the courts, we can begin to examine the underlying jurisprudential and
policy issues implicated in these decisions. Here are some of the issues
that are raised by these recent developments:
1. What are the values of settlement and of adjudication?
2. When is a court not a court? What makes a court a "special"
institution and what should it be doing?10 Related to these concerns
are issues of legal authority for the variations on court adjudicationwhen can a court "order" someone to settle, require a juror to serve a
nonjuror function, or exclude the public from a proceeding?
3. What values should a court-institutionalized ADR device serve?
Who should pay?" Who should have access? What are the conse-

L.

REV. 341 (1990).
For some arguments supporting various forms of ADR, or reactions to the previous critiques,
see Brazil, A Close Look at Three Court-Sponsored ADR Programs: Why They Exist, How
They Operate, What They Deliver and Whether They Threaten Important Values, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 303; Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies
of Quality Arguments, 66 DEN. U.L. REv. 335 (1989); Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CONTE tP. LEGAL ISSUES 1
(1989); Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 424 (1986); McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985);
Menkel-Meadow, supra notes 1 & 6; Norton, Justice and Efficiency in Dispute Systems, 5 OHIo
ST. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 207 (1990); Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation:
Case Management, Two Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253 (1985); Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 29 (1982); Sander,
Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976); Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing:
Mediation and Conciliation, 26 AM. J. Coup. L. 205 (1978); Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37
U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1985); Quality of Dispute Resolution, 66 DEN. U.L. REV. 335 (1989).
In addition, several new journals currently publish material relevant to ADR generally, such as
MEDIATION QUARTERLY,

NEGOTIATION JOURNAL,

MISSOURI JOURNAL OF DISPUTE

RESOLUTION,

and OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
This list of sources is not exhaustive; it is illustrative only and does not report on the empirical
and evaluative literature of specific programs of dispute resolution. See generally Esser, Evaluations of Dispute Processing: We Do Not Know What We Think and We Do Not Think What We
Know, 66 DEN. U.L. REV. 499 (1989).
8. See generally R. COVER, 0. Fiss & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE (1988); R. COVER & 0. FISS,
THE STRUCTURE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1983); Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982); Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405
(1987); Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
9. These forms and processes include issues about efficiency, fairness, notice, access,
forms of proof, and task allocation (party initiated and adversarial).
10. See generally M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981).
11. Several important legal organizations have recently considered the issue of who should
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quences of using ADR devices for the rest of the system? When
should a "public" system "subsidize" private agreements?
4. What are the politics of ADR? Are there patterns of usage? Do
particular kinds of clients choose different processes? Are there differences between big cases and small cases, or in the choices of wealthy
clients and poorer clients?
5. What should be the system or values implicated in case allocation-should it be a free market? Should there be restrictions or regulations of case types? Should these programs be voluntary or
mandatory?
6. How can we measure the effects of different allocations or assignments to particular processes? How should we measure the "qual2
ity" of justice?
7. What processes are appropriate within our system of dispute
resolution? When is adversarialness appropriate, and when is it not?
What other processes can be used while preserving our long tradition
of process-fairness and rights protections?
8. On what bases should cases be settled, decided, or tried-by
considering only legal rules, personal needs, or economic expediency?
These are some of the issues that form the backdrop of competing
visions and values that courts are beginning to address as "new"
forms of ADR come into use within the courts and litigants begin to
use the full arsenal of traditional legal and adversarial practices to
challenge them. Some of these questions raise policy choices that cannot yet be answered with the weak empirical base we have. Thus, I
will conclude by asking more questions and by suggesting that our
needs are for more data and study before we can hope to answer these
questions sensibly. The major question I wish to explore here is
whether new forms of dispute resolution will transform the courts or
whether, in a more likely scenario, the power of our adversarial system will co-opt and transform the innovations designed to redress
some, if not all, of our legal ills. Can legal institutions be changed if
lawyers and judges persist in acting from traditional and conventional
conceptions of their roles and values?

pay for public ADR. See generally American Civil Liberties Union, Special Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Minutes of March 9, 1991 Meeting (available at Fla. Dep't of State,
Div. of Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.); Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Law and
Public Policy Committee, Mandated Participation and Settlement Coercion: Dispute Resolution
as it Relates to the Courts (Jan. 1991) (unpublished report).
12. See generally Quality of Dispute Resolution, supra note 7, at 355; Tyler, The Quality of
Dispute Resolution Procedures and Outcomes: Measurement Problems and Possibilities, 66
DEN. U.L. REV. 419 (1989).
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WHY PURSUE SETTLEMENT?

In what has become a commonly recognized division in the literature and advocacy about ADR, we see two basically different justifications for processes that resolve cases short of trial-what I call
quantitative-efficiency claims versus qualitative-justice claims. 3 These
different conceptions of the purposes of ADR represent vastly different ideologies and perspectives on how disputes should be resolved in
our society. Although efficiency has become the more prominent concern,' 4 1 believe the "quality of justice" proponents actually came first
in very recent history." In the 1960s, as part of several other social
movements advocating more democratic participation in our various
social institutions, 6 a variety of groups 7 urged that dispute resolution
should more fully involve the participants in disputes. This would allow individuals to make their own decisions about what should happen to them. Thus, a model of community empowerment, party
participation, and access to justice was championed by those concerned with substantive justice and democratic process. This "movement" resulted in the funding and support of "neighborhood justice
centers"' 8 and a variety of more indigenous community dispute resolution centers' 9-many of these justified on the grounds of increased
participation and access to justice.

13. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, supra note 2, at 2 (1985); Syverud, The Duty
to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1147 (1990). See generally Brunet, supra note 3; Galanter,... A
Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge 12 J. L. & Soc. 1 (1985); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1;
Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Resolution: The Periphery Becomes the Core, (Book Review) 69 JUDICATURE 300 (1986); Quality of Dispute Resolution, supra note 7.
14. Efficiency has become more prominent in part because of who is associated with each
of the claims. For example, Silbey and Sarat identify the different perspectives on ADR by who
the promoters are so that the justifications here labeled "efficiency" are, in their views, the
claims of the Establishment Bar and Legal Elites. See generally Silbey & Sarat, supra note 7.
15. For a more extended history of alternative dispute resolution in the United States, see
generally J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? (1983).
16. See generally Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System
of Criminal Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. I (1973); McGillis, Minor Dispute Processing: A Review
of Recent Developments, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE-ASSESSMENT OF AN EMERGING IDEA 60 (R.

Tomasic & M. Feeley eds. 1982); Shonholtz, The Citizen's Role in Justice: Building a Primary
Justice and Prevention System at the Neighborhood Level, 494 ANNALS 42 (1987); Singer, Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: The Effects on Justice for the Poor, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 569 (1979).

17. These groups ranged from civil rights groups to consumer advocates.
18. Wahrhaftig, An Overview of Community-Oriented Citizen Dispute Resolution Programs in the United States, in THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 7, at 75. See generally D.
McGi.LLs & J. MULLEN,

NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL MODELS

(Nat'l Inst. L. Enforcement & Crim. Just. No. J-LEAA-030-76, 1977); McGillis, supra note 16.
19. Hofrichter, Neighborhood Justice and the Social Control Problems of American Capitalism: A Perspective, in THE AmmitcAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 7, at 207.
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Others, like myself, have argued that outcomes derived from our
adversarial judicial system or the negotiation that occurs in its
shadows2 are inadequate for solving many human problems. 2' Our legal system produces binary win-lose results in adjudication. It also
produces unreflective compromise-"split the difference" results in
negotiated settlements that may not satisfy the underlying needs or
interests of the parties .22 Human problems become stylized and simplified because they must take a particular legal form for the stating of a
claim.Y Furthermore, the "limited remedial imagination" of courts in
providing outcomes2 restricts what possible solutions the parties could
develop. 25 Some of us have argued that alternative forms of dispute
resolution, or new conceptualizations of old processes, could lead to
outcomes that were efficient in the Pareto-optimal sense 26 of making
both parties better off without worsening the position of the other. In
addition, the processes themselves would be better because they would
provide a greater opportunity for party participation and recognition

20. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1. Marc Galanter calls the game of lawsuits
"litigotiation," a continuous process of negotiation, adjudication, and their subparts that influence each other. Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process,
34 J. LEoAL EDUC. 268, 268 (1984). See generally Galanter, Litigation, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 151 (L. Lipson & S. Wheeler eds. 1986).
21. See generally R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES (1985); Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 1.
22. For a fuller discussion of the limits of and problems with compromise, see H. RAMi'A,
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 35-65 (1982); Menkel-Meadow, supra note I, at 770-75.
See generally COMPRosE IN ETHlCS, LAW AND PoLrics (J. R. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1979).
23. For example, a claim may have to be brought as a tort or contract action, rather than as
a "business" problem.
24. For example, certain actions require certain remedies-only damages or injunctions
might be permitted in a particular case. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 790.
25. Obviously, one of the advantages of settlement is that the parties can be more flexible in
their private settlement agreements than they could be in court. However, as I argued in MenkelMeadow, supra note 1, all too often the parties are limited in their conceptions of settlement
solutions by what the court will permit. Most economists or economics-minded writers assume
that the adjudicated result is what should set the baseline for evaluating negotiated results. See
generally Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979);
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1. From my perspective, the "bargaining endowments" of
legal rules and court decisions are only one source of baseline measurement of the "quality" of
solutions. A much more difficult jurisprudential issue is how to evaluate "quality" Pareto-optimal solutions for the parties that, in particular cases, may depart from the law. A number of
writers on the settlement process find something philosophically wrong with results that do not
track our legal rules. See generally Condlin, Cases on Both Sides: Patterns of Argument in Legal
Dispute Negotiation, 44 MD. L. REv. 65 (1985); Luban, supra note 7; Luban, Bargaining and
Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation and Informal Justice, 14 Pma. & PuB. AFF. 397
(1985).
26. See H. RAIFFA, supra note 22, at 139; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 768-75.
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of party goals. 27 Thus, the "quality" school includes both elements of
process and substantive justice claims. 28 Some of the arguments here
have been supported by the jurisprudential and anthropological work
of those studying the different structures that human beings have developed in response to different disputing functions.2 9
In the mid-to-late 1970s, shortly after the first claims for a different
form of justice, Chief Justice Warren Burger and other judicial administrators began to comment on the work load of the federal and
state courts, and to lament the litigation explosion. 0 They began to
advocate the use of alternative methods of dispute resolution-mediation, arbitration, and others-for the purpose of reducing caseloads
and processing cases more quickly.
Similarly, in the early 1980s an active group of major corporate
counsel began to focus on the high costs of litigation and participated
in the founding of an organization devoted to supporting a variety of
ADR devices. The goal of this organization, the Center for Public Resources (CPR),3 1 is to reduce the legal costs of disputes for the na2
tion's major businesses.1

27. For more extended elaboration, see sources cited supra note 21.
28. Some writers have mistakenly characterized the "quality" issues as primarily interpersonal or relational. Silbey and Sarat assert that those interested in promoting "quality" forms of
ADR are concerned with disputes involving ongoing relationships (including business and property as well as familial or social), or they seek to "therapize" the dispute resolution process by
substituting interpersonal processes for the clarification of legal rights. See Silbey & Sarat, supra
note 7, at 444, 454; see also Silbey & Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL'Y 7,
19-35 (1986). As noted above, the "quality" arguments include both of the processual dimensions- how the process might be conducted and how the parties might relate to each other. Of
equal, or to some greater concern, is the outcome. Such an outcome measure of the quality of a
settlement has to do as much with the substance of the dispute as with the personalities of the
disputants. To borrow a simple phrase from Fisher and Ury (with which I don't entirely agree),
the substantive problem must often be separated from the people. R. FISHER & W. URY, supra
note 21, at 17.
29. These responses occur in our own culture as well as others. See generally L. NADER &
H. TODD, THE DISPUTING PROCESS-LAW IN TEN SOCIETIES (1978); Fuller, Mediation-Its Form
and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305 (1971); Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
30. See generally Burger, Isn't There a Better Way? 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982); Burger, supra
note 1; Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4
(1983); Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986).
31. The Center for Public Resources (CPR) was founded in 1979, with support from private
foundations and memberships of in-house and firm counsel of Fortune 500 companies. The Center is based in New York and performs a wide variety of activities to promote the use of ADR
both in the private sector and in the courts. These activities include education, publication, conferences, consultation, and recommendations for neutral dispute resolvers.
32. There is actually an interesting story to be told here about the relation of in-house counsel seeking to reduce the costs of litigation, at the likely expense of "out-of-house" large-firm
counsel, to participation by both groups in the founding of CPR. By 1990, close to 500 of the
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Many scholars, including myself, have studied and written about
the claims of ADR to speed case-processing. For the most part, we
have found them wanting," although the ever-changing target of court
innovations makes rigorous and comparable study almost impossible.
From yet a third perspective, law and economics scholars study the
efficiency of settlement not from the perspective of a court, but from
the perspective of the parties to determine when settlement is "rational" and "efficient." The purpose is to develop predictive rules
that lead to further efficiency by making it clear when settlement

largest U.S. corporations had signed a CPR "Pledge" to pursue some form of ADR in disputes
with each other, but not with nonsignatories, who would include virtually all individuals disputing with member and nonmember corporations. CPR members are currently debating a similar
"pledge" to be signed by major law firms.
33. See generally S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial Center No. FJC-R-77-G-I, 1977); M. ROSENBERG,
THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964); Church, Civil Case Delay in State
Trial Courts, 4 JUST. SYS. J. 166 (1978); Hensler, What We Know and Don't Know About
Court-Annexed Arbitration, 69 JUDICATURE 270 (1986); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6. More
recent studies are beginning to show some case-processing effects, and they also demonstrate
generally high satisfaction rates among users. See generally J. ADLER, D. HENSLER & C. NELSON,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LITIGANTS F A IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM (1983);
E.A. LIND & J. SI-HAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial Center No. FJC-R-83-4, 1983); E.A. LIND, R. MACCOUN, P.
EBENER, W. FELSTINER, D. HENSLER, J. RESNIK, & T. TYLER, THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT
LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETrLEMENT CONFERENCES (RAND Inst. for Civ. Just. No. R-3708-CJ, 1989); MEDIATION RESEARCH (K. Kressel &

D. Pruitt eds. 1989); McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & Soc. REV. 11 (1984); McEwen & Maiman, Small Claims
Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237 (1981); Norton, supra note
7. This note is only a partial listing of some of the empirical studies of a wide variety of ADR
processes, which are not comparable and may have differing effects. These processes include
arbitration and court-sponsored mediation, see generally K. SHUART, THE WAYNE COUrNTY MEDIATION PROGRAM IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN (Federal Judicial Center 1984), summary jury trials, see generally J. ALFNI, L. GRIFFITHS, R. GETCHELL & D. JORDAN, SUMMARY
JURY TRIALS IN FLORIDA: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT (1989), small claims innovations, see generally Vidmar, The Small Claims Court: A Reconceptualization of Disputes and An Empirical
Evaluation, 18 LAW & Soc. REV. 515 (1984), and neighborhood justice centers, see generally
McGillis, supra note 16. Despite the efforts of Esser to create a bibliography of evaluation studies of ADR, there is as yet no literature which synthetically summarizes the widely divergent
studies which attempt to address the issues of the "efficiency" or effectiveness of court-sponsored ADR. See generally Esser, supra note 7. As difficult a task as this is for public courtsponsored programs, it will be even more difficult to address in evaluating the effectiveness of
ADR innovations in the private sphere, at least with rigorous social scientific controls.
A slightly older body of work has addressed itself to the measurement of process and procedural preferences of disputants. See generally J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); Thibaut, Walker, LaTour & Houlden, Procedural Justice as
Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1974); Walker, LaTour, Lind & Thibaut, Reactions of Participants and Observers to Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 295 (1974). See
also the more recent work of A. LIND & T. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE

(1988).
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makes sense. a4 By creating predictive models, we know that parties
should settle if their expectations of recovery or loss 3 minus the transaction costs are within a "zone of agreement." In economic terms,
the difficulties are in making these calculations under conditions of
imperfect information, uncertainty, and risk. Thus, the bargaining
process is one in which the rational person attempts to obtain information about the law while considering the other parties' preferences.
The person must then assess the probabilities of recovery and determine the risk aversion of each party. Even economists recognize, however, that the dispute resolution system performs two functions-it
resolves disputes for the parties, and it provides public "authoritative" rules for society.3 6 In this way, the "efficiency" of a settlement
can be assessed on both micro and macro levels.37 Too much settlement might result in fewer clear-cut rules, thereby clouding probability assessments and leading to more trials.38 This view of settlement
has begun to influence the law of ADR as several of the law and economics scholars have found their places on the bench. 39
The crucial point here is that different constituencies have pursued
settlement or ADR for vastly different reasons-cheaper and faster is
not necessarily the same thing as better. Those different reasons have

34. For an excellent literature review and bibliography, see generally Cooter & Rubinfeld,
Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LrrEmTu
1067
(1989). See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 25; Priest & Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAl. STUD. 1 (1984).
35. These expectations are determined by the probability of a win or loss at trial.
36. Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 34, at 1070.
37. Recently, Janet Cooper-Alexander has demonstrated that both economic models and
models that attempt to predict outcomes on the basis of strategic use of legal bargaining chips do
not explain the settlements in securities class actions. See generally Cooper-Alexander, Do the
Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1991).
Her findings in the securities cases (that cases settle for a "going rate of 25% of the complaint
demand" because of non-legal merits, structural factors such as attorneys' fees, procedural
rules, risk aversion of the parties, and insurance payment policies) has implications for other
civil case settlements. More frequently than practicing lawyers, legal scholars seem surprised that
cases settle for reasons other than the legal merits, or the law and economics version of the legal
merits (the "expected value" at trial discounted by transaction costs). One of the implications of
Cooper-Alexander's study-and this Article-is that the availability of particular procedures or
processes, and the specific activity that occurs therein, clearly affects the outcomes that are produced. Like other commentators, Cooper-Alexander is concerned that aggregations of private
settlements may compromise important macro public concerns-such as regulation of securities
trading. See generally Condlin, supra note 25; Fiss, supra note 3; Luban, supra note 7.
38. See Priest & Klein, supra note 34, at 5-6 for the "50% rule." Where gains and losses
from litigation are equal to each party, the decisions made by the parties will tend to create
strong bias toward a plaintiff success rate of about 50%. Id. See also Priest, Private Litigants
and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U.L. REv. 527 (1989).
39. This view has also affected these judges as they make decisions about the appropriateness of particular settlement activities. See, e.g., Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Co. 871
F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1988), reversing 848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1988).
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led to very different institutionalized forms of ADR. Confusion about
the purposes behind a particular form of innovation has led to important policy decisions and legal rulings which have given expression to
different values underlying particular forms of ADR. 40
Partly because of the institutionalization of ADR, some of its earliest proponents, including anthropologist Laura Nader, 41 now oppose
ADR because it does not foster communitarian and self-determination
goals. Instead, it is used to restrict access to the courts for some
groups, just at the time when these less powerful groups have achieved
some legal rights. Indeed, some critics have argued that ADR actually
hurts those who are less powerful in our society-like women 42 or racial and ethnic minorities 43-by leaving them unprotected by formal
rules and procedures in situations where informality permits the expression of power and domination that is unmediated by legal restraints." In other criticisms, proceduralists have argued that various
forms of ADR compromise our legal system by privatizing law making, shifting judicial roles, compromising important legal and political
rights and principles, and failing to grant parties the benefits of hundreds of years of procedural protections afforded by our civil and
45
criminal justice rules.
In the context of ordinary litigation, we assume that when the parties settle they are doing so either because they think they have
reached a consensual and wise solution (a "positive" settlement), or
because they fear they will do worse at trial (a "negative" or "satisficing" settlement). The parties may not accurately be able to predict
what might happen in court. However, there is some notion that what
they are contracting out of-the adjudicated result. It is known to
them and is the result of a publicly controlled process. If settlements
are "coerced" by court order and conducted privately at the same
time, we may be less confident in what the parties are agreeing to, and

40.

See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13.

41.
See generally L. NADER, LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY (1969); L. NADER, No ACCESS
TO LAW (1980). Contrast with comments in Proceedings of the Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy-Dispute Resolution (1985). See A. LEvN, E. GREEN, J. ETHERIDGE, C. MENKEL-MEADOW, T. LAMBROS, DxSPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES IN A DEMOCRATIC
SocIETY 130-31 (1985) [hereinafter DIsPtrrE RESOLUTION DEVICES].

42. See generally Alschuler, supra note 7; Fineman, supra note 7; Grillo, supra note 7;
Lerman, supra note 7; Woods, supra note 7.
43. See generally Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, supra note 7; Edwards, 'supra
note 3; Yamamoto, supra note 7.
44. For example, the failure to compel information through formal discovery sanctions may
place certain persons at a disadvantage.
45. Such proceduralists include Owen Fiss and Judith Resnik. See generally Fiss, supra note
3; Resnik, supra note 3; Resnik, supra note 7.
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we may have less opportunity to regulate abuses. This decreased opportunity comes from our inability to observe how settlements are
reached. This problem is further compounded if for some reason we
do not trust parties to resist certain forms of settlement, especially if
they cannot afford to "resist" and go to trial.
Given the widely disparate views of the functions and purposes of
ADR, why should we pursue settlement? Without restating my previously elaborated views,4 solutions which attempt to meet many of the
needs and interests of the parties 47 have the potential of realizing an
outcome that is fairer, more sensitive to the complex needs of the parties, and more likely to be followed. This is particularly true in a process in which the parties have some control of their dispute, rather than
having their past failings decided upon by a third party without regard
to any possible future relationship.4 8
This, however, is not true in all cases. For example, when a moral
principle must be enunciated, 49 or a legal precedent is necessary, 50 or
the parties are not equally empowered with respect to their dispute,
additional factors must be considered. But it may be true for many
fact-intensive cases which come into our legal system with few legal
principles at stake. 5
Thus, the key to answering the question "why pursue settlement?"
is to know what the alternatives are and to determine by what standards both settlement and the alternatives will be measured. This implicates two of the major theoretical and philosophical questions
confronting the innovations of ADR: (1) are there principled reasons
for preferring one process or result over another?, 5 2 and (2) by what

46. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1.
47. This statement describes parties as abstractions. One of the issues about whether ADR
is appropriate focuses on the concrete situation of the parties-if there are great power imbalances between the parties, for example, the case may be inappropriate for nonjudicial or nonthird party resolution.
48. 1 do not mean to restrict this comment to ongoing relationship cases. It can refer simply
to the future likelihood of achieving compliance with a court order.
49. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) are obvious examples.
50. There is debate, for example, about whether the important "first impression" issues
involved in the asbestos litigation were best left to courts or to private settlement arenas.
51. See generally Brazil, supra note 7.
52. This problem is also known as the "allocation problem." The ADR literature is replete
with attempts to develop a taxonomy or classification system for allocating different disputes to
different dispute resolution forms. See generally Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the
Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 893;
Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. I (1985).
1 long ago abandoned such attempts because of the dynamic processes of many legal disputes. I
think we will be able to make allocation decisions at the extremes (cases that are totally "fact"
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standards of appropriateness for dispute resolution should such decisions be measured?"
Can we evaluate settlements produced by ADR mechanisms as a totality, or do their different forms and practices-as developed both in
the public and private spheres-raise different issues that must be analyzed on a critical, case-by-case, principled basis? This is the nature of
our common law system of adjudication-to deal with issues on a
case-by-case basis. In the remainder of this Article, I examine some of
the first cases challenging ADR devices used in the courts-the public
sphere-in the hope of developing some principled bases for determining when and how we should pursue settlement. As ADR becomes
institutionalized within the court system, one can ask whether advocacy is one of many tools of dispute resolution, or whether alternative
forms of dispute resolution will be captured by the dominant culture
of adversarial advocacy. If the processes of adversarial adjudication
and "facilitated" settlement 4 are joined in the same institutions, what
are the implications for each process? More importantly, what are the
implications for justice?
III.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND LEGALIZATION OF

ADR

ADR has found its way into the legal system in a variety of forms. I
am primarily concerned here with those which the courts in the formal
legal system have adopted or approved. In the private arena, negotiated settlement, arbitration, mediation, mini-trials," and private judgor totally "law"), but I have seen too many cases that seemed to belong to one category actually
flourish in a dispute resolution process that some might think inappropriate (i.e., the private
settlement or mediation of a public employment discrimination lawsuit). See generally Norton,
supra note 7.
53. This is known as the "baseline problem." The problem of against what standard various processes should be measured has been a methodological problem that has confronted evaluation researchers, philosophers, legal theorists, and economists studying the settlement
phenomenon. Most commonly, settlement is measured against some homogenized and generalized notion of "adjudication." See generally Fiss, supra note 3; Resnik, supra note 3. Political
scientist Herbert Kritzer has suggested that in fact the amount of "adjudication" in our legal
system is greater than many assume because a large number of case terminations or resolutions
actually do involve some authoritative ruling by the court, such as a summary judgment decision
or other motion decision. See generally Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the
Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161 (1986). More recently, the various forms of ADR have been homogenized and generalized and have been compared to the more typical private dyadic negotiated
settlement or "shadow bargain." See Luban, supra note 7, at 389. For a discussion of baseline
issues as they effect measurement problems, see generally Tyler, supra note 12.
54. While serving as a technical definition of one form of dispute resolution-mediation-I
use the term "facilitated settlement" generically here to refer to all forms of court-assisted or
court-encouraged settlement practices, particularly those that use some form of third party involvement.
55. Mini-trials are a hybrid form of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. See generally
Green, The Mini-TrialHandbook, in CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT (E. Green ed. 1982).
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ing have been developed. A variety of private consulting firms and
professional entities promote ADR and provide professional expertise
in developing ADR mechanisms to suit particular disputes. 6 More
problematic has been the privatization" of public dispute resolvers.
In the public sector, courts have used the primary forms of dispute
resolution by encouraging negotiation and settlement, by increasing
the use of mandatory settlement conferences, 9 and by instituting both
6
mandatory and more consensual forms of arbitration and mediation. 0
In addition, federal district judge Thomas Lambros created a new

56. The organizations ENDISPUTE, JUDICATE, and American Mediation Service are examples of such private consulting firms. In addition, a new breed of private practitioner now
specializes in ADR, either within a conventional law firm or in a practice specially devoted to
dispute resolution services. Former Steptoe & Johnson partner Marguerite Millhauser's Conflict
Consulting, Inc., Washington, D.C. is just one example.
Perhaps the largest effort at private dispute resolution was the formation of the Asbestos
Claims Facility. This was an entity created with the assistance of Dean Emeritus Harry Wellington, on behalf of manufacturers of asbestos and their insurers, to facilitate prompt payment to
asbestos plaintiffs with ADR mechanisms available to resolve disputes between and among producers and insurers. See generally Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of A Public
Problem, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 375 (1984-85); Asbestos Claims Facility Goes Public, 2 ALTERNATIVES 1 (1984). The Asbestos Claim Facility disbanded in 1988 when several of its leading members resigned over disputes about the proper allocation of formulas for contributions and
payments. Some of the producers and insurers also thought that they could decrease the amount
of money they were paying out by litigating. Some of the remaining members have formed a new
successor entity.
57. The issue of privatization of dispute resolution services is a big one with analogues in a
wide variety of social services and institutions, such as health, education, see generally J. CHUaB
& T. MoE, POLITICS, MARKETS AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990), prisons, and resource management. The question of what services should be provided by public governmental entities and
what should be allocated to the private market sphere is beyond the scope of this paper, but the
issues implicated in the privatization of dispute resolution may have rippling effects in other
public service areas, not to mention implications for the significant legal issues encountered in
the public/private constitutional dichotomy. See generally Symposium on the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
58. One example of this method is California's "Rent-a-Judge" procedure, authorized by
CAL. CIVIL PROC. CODE §§ 638-645 (West 1990). For discussions of this method, see generally
Chernick, The Rent-a-Judge Option: A Primer for Commercial Litigators, 12 L.A. LAW. 18
(Oct. 1989); Gnaizda, Secret Justicefor the PrivilegedFew, 66 JUDICATURE 6 (1982); Note, The
CaliforniaRent-a-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Policy Considerationsof Pay-As- YouGo Courts, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1592 (1981). A recent study of the California Judicial Council
cooly endorsing private judging has met with a great deal of controversy. Carrizosa, Judicial
Council Wants New Study of PrivateJudges, L.A. Daily Journal, Nov. 19, 1990, at I.
59. FED. R. Ctv. P. 16. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6.
60. See generally P. EBENER & D. BETANCOURT, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION: THE NATIONAL PICTURE (RAND Inst. for Civ. Just. No. N-2257-ICJ, 1985) (documenting the results of
a national survey which determined how many state and federal jurisdictions had authorized
arbitration for civil cases); K. SHUART, supra note 33 (examining a mediation procedure in use
under a local rule of the Eastern District of Michigan with reference to operation and performance. This procedure relied on the Mediation Tribunal Association, an independent, nonprofit
organization, to supply a pool of mediators who would be assigned complete responsibilities for
resolution of certain cases).
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form of ADR for the courts in the early 1980s-the summary jury
trial. 6' This "trial" involves a shortened form of case presentation,
usually without witnesses, to a "shadow" jury chosen from the jury
venire62 who provide a "verdict" which is used to facilitate more "reasonable" party negotiations. Courts vary a great deal in the requirements for these procedures. Requirements range from mandatory
participation and binding orders to nonbinding orders or consensual
processes with or without penalties for failure to participate or failure
63
to accept a settlement offer.
Most recently, the Judicial Improvements Act of 199064 now requires each federal district court to develop a civil justice expense and
delay plan. Each court must use an advisory committee consisting of
"attorneys and other persons who are representative of major categories of litigants in such court. ' 65 The court, in consultation with its
advisory group, must consider "authorization to refer appropriate
cases to alternative dispute resolution programs ... including mediation, minitrial, and summary jury trial.""6 In addition, this new statute urges consideration of such other litigation cost and delay
management devices as requiring parties with authority to settle to be
available for settlement conferences.6 7 Thus, Congress has begun to
urge (if only at the "optional" district court level for the present) institutionalization of many ADR devices within the courts, including
some of those challenged by the litigation discussed herein. The Act
provides for the development of model plans for case management,
61. See generally Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution-A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the
Operation of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984).
62. See Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that
jurors could not be ordered to participate in summary jury trials).
63. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68 for an example of a settlement offer process; see also Marek v.
Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) (when settlement offer is made under FED. R. Civ. P. 68 and rejected, and judgment finally obtained is not greater than original offer, offeror is not liable for
offeree's attorney's fees incurred after the offer of settlement).
64. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 1991 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws (104 Stat.) 5089 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82). Interestingly, provisions of
this bill were originally introduced as mandatory requirements for the courts to begin to employ
particular case management and settlement devices, but in the final form these provisions were
permissive only except for the specified pilot and demonstration districts. See 136 CONC. REC.
S17575 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Biden). See also Congress Approves Civil
Justice Reform Law; ADR, Case Management to Play Large Roles, 8 ALTERNATIVES 195 (Dec.
1990).
65. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, (104 Stat.) 5094 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §
478(b)).
66. Id. at 5092 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.§ 473(a)(6)(B)).
67. Id. at 5092-93 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §473(b)(5)). See discussion of Heileman
Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1988) infra notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
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sets up several demonstration districts, and authorizes training and a
final report (to be completed in four years) on implementing such litigation cost and delay reduction plans."
The language of the new statute is notable for its adoption of efficiency goals and purposes as the stated objectives. More significantly,
the Act may represent a new chapter in debates about allocation of
decision-making authority about court processes between Congress
and the courts themselves. Thus, arguments about institutionalization
of various ADR and litigation management devices will continue while
embedded in larger issues of separation of powers and procedural justice.
In addition to private and public forums for dispute resolution,
ADR has been institutionalized in the professional organizations and
associations it has spawned: the Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution (SPIDR), CPR, the National Institute of Dispute Resolution (NIDR), the ADR Section of the American Association of Law
Schools (AALS), and an American Bar Association (ABA) Special
Committee on Dispute Resolution. It has also produced several publi7
70
cations: a BNA Reporter, 69 CPR's Newsletter, NIDR's Newsletter, '

and several specialized law reviews.72 In addition, 164 law schools now
offer courses in ADR, with 574 professors teaching the subject. 7
What has this "institutionalization" meant? Has the growth and
expansion of alternative dispute resolution institutions changed the
consciousness of those whose job it is to solve legal problems?
In my view, the qualified answer to these questions is no. This is
illustrated by the cases which are now beginning to deal with some of
the difficult legal issues raised by the uses of ADR. As we survey some
of these developments, I suggest that attempts to innovate have been
partly, if not totally, "captured" and co-opted by the uses to which
advocates have put these new procedures. At the same time, advocates
"attacking" or "manipulating" ADR may tell us something about its
limits and abuses in the court system and alert us to the regulatory
boundaries that may be necessary to keep each process working within
its proper sphere.
68.
69.

Id. at 5089-94.
BNA's Alternative Dispute Resolution Report was first published on April 30, 1987.

70. CPR's newsletter, Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation, was first published in
January, 1983.
71. Dispute Resolution Forum has been published since 1985.
72.

These include the MISsoURI

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION and the OHIo STATE
See also 66 DEN. U.L. REV. (1989); 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. (1987);
14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. (1987); 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. (1989); 37 U. FLA. L. REV. (1985); 21
WILLAMETTE L. REV. (1985).
73. West Publishing, 42 LAW SCH. NEWS 2 (Feb. 1990).
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
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I was first struck by the omnipresence of the adversary model when,
as a mediator for the Asbestos Claim Facility, I received a copy of a
letter in which one party had "filed an ADR proceeding against''74 the
other party. The fact that the process had been labeled a mediation
process did nothing to move the parties away from their adversarial
perceptions of each other. The ADR proceeding of "mediation" was
just a condition precedent to be attended to on the way to litigation.

As the parties engaged in more disputing about the rules of the proceedings,7 it became clear that ADR was just another stop in the "litigotiation" game which provides an opportunity for the manipulation
of rules, time, informati6n, and ultimately, money.
As ADR has been increasingly used by courts and by private institutions of dispute resolution, it has been increasingly "legalized"made the subject of legal regulation, in both private and public rules
systems. Skillful lawyers are raising legitimate claims regarding the
constitutionality of some of the aspects of ADR-such as infringements of the right to a jury trial, separation of powers, due process,
and equal protection.76 Other claims which may not be as legitimate-

such as refusing to participate in arbitration by claiming that it is coerced discovery-demonstrate that ADR has become just another battleground for adversarial fighting rather than multi-dimensional
problem-solving.
In reviewing the following recent cases, I have identified some of
the recurring policy issues that emerge in this "legalization of ADR."

74. The analysis of the use of language and metaphor by lawyers engaged in dispute resolution practices could itself be the subject of study. Even as the "forms" are changed to technically less adversarial models, the language of adversarial litigation remains quite powerful. For
example, many mediation programs label one party the complainant and the other the respondent, rather than "the parties." The programs also use ground rules remarkably close to trial
rules-opening statements, cross-examinations, closing "arguments," and rebuttals. See, e.g.,
L. BURTON, TRAINING MANUAL FOR MEDIATORS (Neighborhood Justice Center 1986). See generally the work of William O'Barr and his colleagues on the discourse of litigation practices. J.
CONLEY & W. O'BARR, RULES vs. RELATIONSHIPS: Tit ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE
(1990); Conley, O'Barr & Lind, The Power of Language: PresentationalStyle in the Courtroom,
78 DUKE L.J. 1375 (1978). See also Cobb & Rifkin, Neutrality as a Discursive Practice: The
Construction and Transformation of Narratives in Community Mediation, paper presented to
1990 Law & Society Meeting, San Francisco.
75. Disputing about the rules is particularly strong evidence of the persistence of an adversary culture, particularly since the Asbestos Claims Facility has a detailed specification of rules
and procedures to be followed. CPR has prepared detailed procedural practice manuals for mediation, arbitration, mini-trials, technology disputes, employment disputes, international commercial disputes, environmental disputes, and a variety of other specialized areas (e.g., high
technology disputes). See generally CPR LEGAL PROGRAM. PRACTICE GUDE SERIES (1988-90)
(currently 22 volumes).
76. Golann, Making ADR Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REv. 487, 493
(1989).
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Contradictionsin "Mandatory" ADR

Much of what motivates the "quality" proponents of ADR is the
notion that the parties have to want to resolve their disputes in a different way. However they come to understand the process, the key to
arriving at "quality" solutions is through motivating the parties to
recognize that the courts will not give them what they want by win77
lose judgments of damages or through the use of injunctive relief.
Thus, in its purest form, the key to effective dispute resolution is
found in voluntary participation by the parties and commitment to the
78
process of mediation.
Many of the current programs that require parties to submit to arbitration or mediation programs (either in all cases or in those under a
specified value) make participation mandatory. 9 Some of the objections to these mandatory processes have made their way through the
courts. In Strandell v. Jackson County,80 the Seventh Circuit held that
litigants could not be forced to use the summary jury trial device. 8'
The facts are instructive because they demonstrate the clash of "quality" versus "quantity" arguments. The plaintiffs were parents of a
man who committed suicide after he was subjected to a strip search
and arrest.8 2 Through discovery, plaintiffs' attorney obtained the

77. Of course, not all judgments are binary or rigid formulations of damages and injunctions. There are "compromise verdicts," comparative negligence considerations, and all kinds of
equitable relief. There is also the more complex kind of ruling in a wide variety of law reform,
institutional, and public law cases. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and Extraordinary
in InstitutionalLitigation, 93 HAv. L. Rav. 465 (1980).
78. See generally J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIAION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION (1984); C. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT (1986); N. ROGERS & C. McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW,
POLICY, PRACTICE (1989); N. ROGERS & R. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE
LAW

(1987).

79. The law "forces" people to bargain, negotiate, or settle. Judges argue over whether
FED. R. Civ. P. 16 authorizes mandatory settlement conferences, see infra notes 80-104, and
accompanying text. Labor law requires labor and management to bargain "in good faith." 29
U.S.C. §§ 158(a)5, 158(b)3, 158(d) (1988).
80. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988). This case was brought as a civil
rights action.
81. Id. at 888. The case has been the subject of much commentary. See generally Alfini,
Summary Jury Trials in State and FederalCourts: A Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of
ParticipatingLawyers, 4 Oo ST. J. DispuTE RESOLUTnON 213 (1989); Maatman, The Future of
Summary Jury Trials in Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J. MARSItHALL L. RE.
455 (1988); Wiegand, A New Light Bulb or the Work of the Devil? A Current Assessment of
Summary Jury Trials, 69 OR. L. REV. 87 (1990); Note, Compelling Alternatives: The Authority
of Federal Judges to Order Summary Jury Trial Participation,57 FoaDHAm L. REV. 483 (1988);
Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring Fairand Effective Processes, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1086 (1990).
82. 838 F.2d at 884.
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names and statements of twenty-one witnesses.83 Defendants later
tried unsuccessfully to obtain these names and statements but could

not because they were protected under the work-product doctrine.8
Initially, the district judge asked the parties to voluntarily submit to a

summary jury trial. 81Plaintiffs' counsel refused, partly because he did
not want to reveal the names and statements of the witnesses before
trial.8 In short, plaintiffs' counsel saw the summary jury trial as an
opportunity for "free discovery" on the part of a less than diligent
defense counsel. The district judge tried to persuade the parties to participate because his full docket would have made him unable to get to
the case "in the foreseeable months ahead." ' 87 Plaintiffs' counsel then
refused to participate in the summary jury trial ordered by the district
judge, and counsel was held in criminal contempt. 88 The judge rested
his authority to order the summary jury trial on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16, which authorizes judges to facilitate settlement of the

case. 89 The district judge stated that "the ability of a court to use its
best judgment to move its crowded docket must be preserved, where it
involves a nonbinding yet highly successful procedure. " 9 The Seventh

Circuit rejected this view, noting that it was not commenting on the
effectiveness of the proceeding where parties volunteered to participate. 91 It held that Rule 16 did not extend to requiring settlement and
stated that "Rule 16 ... was not designed as a means of clubbing the
parties-or one of them-into an involuntary compromise. ' 92 The
court was troubled by the effect a summary jury trial would have on
the discovery process and the work-product doctrine, 93 and it sup-

83. Id. at 885.
84. Id. at 884.
85. Id. at 885.
86. In terms of the practical realities of the case, some of the witnesses were either present
or former employees at the jail, and there was fear that they would be intimidated into changing
their stories before trial after the public "exposure" of a summary jury trial.
87. 838 F.2d at 885. The record indicates that the case was fully ready for trial and the
judge's inability to put it on the trial docket served as a "threat" to force settlement. There is
also some suggestion that the defendants, and possibly the judge, specifically wanted to prevent
public exposure of this case. Civil rights cases like Strandell are likely to raise these issues of
opposite preferences on the part of each party for public exposure versus privacy.
88. Id. at 885.
89. Id.at 886; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5), 16(c).
90. 838 F.2d at 886.
91. Id. at 886 n.2. The court noted the conflicting commentary on the effectiveness of summary jury trials. Id. (citing Lambros, supra note 61; Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other
Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cm. L. REV.
366, 386 (1986)).
92. Id. at 887 (quoting Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985)).
93. In Strandell, the court seems to accept an archaic notion of surprise at trial that the
summary jury trial would interfere with. 838 F.2d at 888. Similarly, concerns about privilege and
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ported the rights of litigants to proceed to trial with confidential and
protected information.94
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Strandell is interesting because it
does not comment on the need for voluntariness for the negotiation
process to be successful, but instead further inscribes the rights of parties to adversary trials at which new information and surprise is entirely appropriate and may be necessary to challenge power
imbalances. Thus, it is the value of the adversary proceeding, and the
parties' right to choose that process in this particular context, rather
than the ineffectiveness of the ADR proceeding that is the court's concern. Several other district courts have refused to follow the rationale
of Strandell and have authorized mandatory participation in summary
jury trials. 9"
In contrast to Strandell, the same court held that a judge or magistrate could require a party, and not just the lawyer, to attend a mandatory settlement conference.96 The Heileman majority based its
decision on a more expansive reading of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 and the "inherent power" of courts to develop procedural
work-product doctrine should be no different here than in the general discovery process. In Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988), the
district court criticized Strandell and stated:
[B]ecause of the extensive pre-trial procedures involved in preparing litigation in federal courts and because [summary jury trial] is based on facts disclosed by discovery
and is to be a synopsis of the actual trial, it is difficult to believe that anything would
be disclosed at a [summary jury trial] that would not ultimately be disclosed at the
actual trial. If the Seventh Circuit implication is that a [summary jury trial] prevents
the litigant from saving some surprise for the trial, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to avoid that eventuality. Trial by ambush is no longer an accepted
method of practice.
Id. at 606.
94. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888. The Sixth Circuit has also disapproved of some aspects of
mandatory settlement. See Tiedel v. Northwestern Michigan College, 865 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1988)
(court refused to sustain the shifting of attorneys' fees where the plaintiff refused to accept a
mediated settlement from the Michigan mandatory mediation program and went on to lose at
trial).
95. See McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (summary jury trial
ordered over the objection of plaintiffs); Arabian American Oil, Co. vs. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D.
448 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (summary jury trial ordered over the plaintiff's objection that it was a
waste of time and money because settlement was an impossibility); Home Owners Funding Corp.
v. Century Bank, 695 F.Supp. 1343 (D. Mass. 1988) (noting that a court has the power to order
a summary jury trial under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988) (summary jury
trial ordered by magistrate over objections by all parties to proceeding because the parties all
claimed they were too far apart to come to any reasonable settlement and because the cost-over
$50,000-of the summary jury trial itself would be excessive).
S96. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(involving four million dollars and a possible lengthy trial over factually complex contracts
claims having to do with installation of a water treatment facility). The decision was a slim 6-5
majority with several concurring and dissenting opinions.
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authority beyond, or in interpretation of, the Federal Rules.9 7 Writing
for the majority, Circuit Judge Michael Kanne noted that pretrial settlement conferences were an effective way to alleviate court delays.98
In a sense, the view that mandatory procedures of settlement help reduce delay is in the nature of a "cultural" fact-believed by those
who want to believe it even if belied by the empirical reality. Judge
Kanne thought the function of a broader reading of Rule 16 was to
"urge judges to make wider use of their powers and to manage actively their dockets from an early stage."9' That power was held to
require represented parties to appear at settlement conferences.'1 ° In
this case, therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to require a busy
executive to travel from Camden, New Jersey to Madison, Wisconsin
for a settlement conference.' 0' When the corporate defendant failed to
send an authorized representative to the settlement conference, the defendant (Joseph Oat Corporation) was fined $5,860.01.2 Ironically,
the case eventually settled with a summary jury trial, and a payment
by the defendant to the plaintiff for the allegedly defective wastewater
pretreatment system. 0 3 In his opinion, Judge Kanne expressed the
view that the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (specifically subsections (b)(7) and (c)) contemplated a
distinction between being required to attend settlement conferences
and being compelled to reach a settlement.'01
The views of the dissenting judges express many of the concerns
about mandatory settlement processes. Though most of the dissenters
did so on the basis of their different readings of Federal Rule 16 and

97. Id. at 651.
98. Id. Note here the persistence of the view that such mandatory settlement techniques do
affect court caseloads, despite the empirical evidence to the contrary. The empirical evidence on
the effectiveness of mandatory settlement conferences in reducing court dockets does not support a claim that settlement conferences should be used for efficiency purposes. See generally M.
ROSENBERG, supra note 33; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6; Posner, supra note 91. As a judge
and scholar, Judge Posner raises the efficiency issue by suggesting that if judges spend their time
at mandatory settlement conferences, they may actually reduce court efficiency by being less
available to try cases. Posner, supra note 91, at 382.
99. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 652.
100. Id. at 654-55. The court also recognized that such powers could be abused. Id. at 653
(citing Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985) (reversing a district court judge who tried to
coerce the parties into settlement by threatening sanctions against any party who did not comply
with his settlement recommendation)).
101. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 654.
102. Id. at 650. This amount covered the costs of attendance at the conference by other
parties and counsel. Id.
103. Courts Can Compel Clients to Attend Settlement Talks, 7 ALTERNATVES 77 (1989).
104. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 653. This distinction is not dissimilar from the requirements in
labor law to bargain "ingood faith" without being compelled to reach agreement or to reach a
substantively "fair" agreement. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wooster Div., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).

22

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:1

the "inherent powers" doctrine, Judge Easterbrook expressed concern
that judicial orders to attend settlement conferences would eventually
prove to be economically inefficient for managers paid to manage and
not to engage in litigation. 05 As expressed by Judge Posner, "[tihe
broader concern . .. is that in their zeal to settle cases judges may
ignore the value of other people's time. One reason people hire lawyers is to economize on their own investment of time in resolving disputes."' 6 Judges Posner and Easterbrook, both proponents of law
and economics efficiency measures of the judicial system,'W thus find
demonstration of cost savings to the judicial system weak. As a result,
they are concerned about efficiency losses to the litigants in having to
attend settlement conferences.10 8 Thus, efficiency measures may be
different for individual parties-those required to attend the conferences-than for the judicial system as a whole. Even if party-attended
mandatory settlement conferences produced more or better settlements in the aggregate, and there is no clear evidence that they do, the
costs to the litigants in any particular case may be great. Even this
simple measure of efficiency must be calculated with respect to different institutional players and spheres. The judicial system's efficiency
may turn out to be inefficient for the market and other spheres of the
state.
There may be an ironic truth in this position. Many of the alternative settlement practices were designed to decrease the time that corporate executives and other busy litigants were to spend in litigation.
One of the major motivating impulses of the private mini-trial is that
busy executives were to spend a short amount of time focusing on a
major case, rather than spending more time at depositions and trial.
But, the siccess of the mini-trial is in part due to its difference from
the traditional full trial. Were every case processed through a minitrial, executives and other litigants would indeed be spending a great
deal of time on cases, perhaps at an earlier stage, perhaps with some
success at settlement, but also perhaps in duplicative time if the cases
did not settle and were eventually tried. Thus, Judges Easterbrook

105. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 663 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting).
107. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 25.
108. Judge Posner has expressed the view in his scholarly writing, as well as in his opinions,
that caseload problems should be solved through the use of other than mandatory settlement
devices. See generally R. POSNER, TmE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985). Some of
these methods include increased fees for filing and restrictions on federal jurisdiction (both on
substantive and diversity grounds). Id. These measures would raise entrance barriers as a preferred method of reducing federal courts overload. Id. This approach based on restrictions to
access to courts, however, has been soundly criticized. See, e.g., Garth, supra note 3; Varat,
Economic Ideology and The Federal Judicial Task, 74 CALrF. L. REv. 649 (1986).
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and Posner may be prescient in seeing the mandatory settlement conference being used increasingly to attempt to produce settlement with
the ultimate effect of causing more time to be expended in litigation,
rather than less. Thus, the ironies of the "quantitative-efficiency" justifications of settlement may in fact come to encumber whatever efficiency gains are claimed for such processes if they become mandatory
and routinized. If party attendance at settlement proceedings becomes
the norm rather than the "exception," litigation costs in money and
time may in fact increase. As George Priest has argued, litigants may
be sensitive to procedural reforms by making their own decisions to
litigate or settle as a result of both increases and decreases in delay.'°9
This produces an "equilibrium" in court congestion which may not be
"cured" by mandatory ADR reforms."10
In a variation on the mandatory theme, at least one federal judge
has refused to permit a voluntary and joint motion for a summary
jury trial on the ground that jurors could not be required to serve in a
proceeding not authorized by the Jury Selection and Service Act."' He
concluded that a summary jury trial was not service on either a petit
or grand jury." 2 Further, he stated that summary jury trials as settlement devices, rather than as trials, were not appropriate uses of jurors
serving under federal law." 3 Adopting the view expressed in Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. General Electric Co. 14 that summary jury
trials are private settlement proceedings rather than public trials, the
judge found no legal authorization for the use of jurors.' Quoting
Judge Posner, the district court judge said "nothing in the Jury Selection and Service Act ... empower[s] federal judges to summon jurors
to serve as mediators. ' " 6 The judge also rejected the analogy to advisory juries authorized under the Rules Enabling Act and under Rule
39 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by explaining that advisory
juries were intended to advise judges in deciding cases, not to assist
parties in settling cases.'1' 7 The decision in Hume demonstrates general
hostility to the summary jury trial device itself, both on grounds of
lack of legal authorization"" and as a matter of policy:

See generally Priest, supra note 38.
See generally id.
28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982).
Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
Id.
854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988).
Hume,129F.R.D. at 509.
Id. at 509 n.7 (quoting Posner, supra note 91, at 385-86).
Id. at 508 n.5. (citing M. JACOUROVITCH & C. MOORE, SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF Omo (Federal Judicial Center No. FJC-R-82-1, 1982)).
118. The district court judge in Hume rejected all readings of Federal Rules 1, 16, and 39
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

24

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:1

In my own view, Summary Jury Trial is an unenlightened step
backwards. It is reminiscent of a prior legal era, dominated by
procedural mechanisms which stifled the candid exposition of the
merits. For instance, the non-binding nature of Summary Jury Trials
presents great temptation to strategically withhold evidence and
argument. Furthermore, when forced, a party might view it as an
unacceptable burden or bludgeon.' 9

However, the key concern expressed is that of using jurors on "conscription" to government service for services which are not authorized.
Thus, as these cases illustrate, the courts are at best ambivalent
about whether it is helpful to mandate settlement and if so in what
forms. While some courts have made it clear that "coerced settlement" will not be legitimated, the press for resolution of cases and
docket reduction will permit, in some courts, a broad reading of the
Federal Rules to encourage settlement practices like meeting and conferring with a judge or magistrate and the summary jury trial. One
issue to watch in the future is whether settlements negotiated within
such environments will be secure, or whether post hoc attacks and appeals on their "coerciveness" will increase in a civil analogue to efforts to undo a guilty plea in the criminal context.
The issue of the compulsion or "mandatoriness" of settlement devices in the courts is more complex than most of the cases or commentary acknowledge. In efforts to find bright lines to distinguish
settlement functions from trial and advocacy functions, most courts
and commentators have paid insufficient attention to the overlapping
nature of these enterprises. Summary jury trials are settlement devices
that closely resemble trials with adversary presentations and strong
advocacy on the part of lawyers. They are designed to present a
"shadow verdict" of what a "real" juror would do at trial to guide
the parties to a more realistic assessment of their expected outcomes.
Thus, some of the full protections of court proceedings, such as evidentiary rulings, may be necessary to assure accuracy of outcome.
Similarly, as judges and magistrates order counsel and parties to meet
and confer, it may be important to develop some rules and guidelines
to assure some modest degree of uniformity and fairness.

and the "inherent power to manage courts and dockets" doctrine, as well as other theories on
which the summary jury trial has been based. Id. at 510. See generally M. JACOUBOVITCH & C.
MOORE, supra note 117; Lambros, supra note 61.
119. 129 F.R.D. at 508 n.3.
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Thus, while many commentators argue that settlement processes
should proceed only consensually in the courts,'20 I believe that until
we know more about the effectiveness of settlement-seeking devices,
the line should not be drawn between mandatory and consensual processes.' 2' Rather, the line should be drawn between abusive uses of
mandatory processes 122 and those used within the bounds of fairness
and our existing rules. If the summary jury trial is a hybrid of a trial,
a settlement discussion, and a discovery device, then its conduct can
be governed by the rules which apply to such forms. If we are to seek
"quality" resolutions of our legal problems, it is not clear that cases
will select themselves into the proper categories. Some good mandatory practices offer the possibility of subjecting all cases to similar
treatment, 23 both for purposes of evaluation, and to allow some adversarial testing (through legal claims and arguments) of the quality
and justice of these procedural innovations. As long as traditional advocacy does not entirely swamp efforts to use innovative settlement
devices, such testing should help establish guidelines for good settlement practice.
B.

Public Access to Settlements

From another quarter, where the claims are usually brought by nonparties to the litigation, one of the major critiques of the development
of ADR techniques has been that ADR privatizes disputing. To the
extent that mandatory settlement conferences, mediation, and summary jury trials result in settlements before a full public trial, they
may rob the public of important information.124 Some critics charge
that with so much private settlement there will not be enough public
debate, or enough cases going through the traditional adversary system, to produce good law.

120. After all, parties proceed only consensually in the private sector when they explore alternative ways of resolving their disputes.
121. In such a system, the cases closest to settlement would be most likely to use the public
resources of settlement devices in the court sphere and thus might present system inefficiencies.
122. The more common standard for analyzing settlement practices in the courts is "abuse
of discretion." See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 655 (7th Cir.
1989). In some uses of the summary jury trial, jurors are not told that they have served in a
different capacity than on a petit jury. Many judges, including Judge Posner, find this practice
dishonest as well as violative of law. See Posner, supra note 91, at 386-87, 389.
123. This would enhance empirical assessments of their effectiveness as well.
124. See generally Fiss, supra note 3. See also the remarks of Judith Resnik and Laura Nader
at the Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference. DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES, supra note
41, at 129, 131.
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These issues were raised in the case of CincinnatiGas & Electric Co.
v. General Electric Co.' 25 The Cincinnati Post sought to reverse an
order requiring confidentiality and closed proceedings in the summary
jury trial conducted by the district court. 26 The district court, in barring the newspaper from attending the hearing, stated that "[t]he
summary jury trial, for all it may appear like a trial, is a settlement
technique.' ' 27 The court went on to hold that there was no first
amendment right of access to a settlement proceeding because settlement proceedings were historically private and not subject to public
scrutiny. 28 The Cincinnati Post argued that the nature of the case was
such that important public interests were involved, and it would be
decided more fruitfully if the public could know about the proceedings. 29 In rejecting this second claim, the Sixth Circuit protected the
parties' desire for confidentiality over whatever public interest there
might be, under a rationale that was based on the importance of the
governmental interest in promoting settlements: 30 "Therefore, allowing access would undermine the substantial governmental interest in
promoting settlements and would not play a 'significant positive role
in the functioning of the particular process in question."""' The court
noted that the public would have no right to participate in private negotiations between and among the parties. 3 2 Because the summary
jury trial was not binding and involved no adjudication, it was like a
private negotiation and could not be observed.' 33
Some critics have observed that all the values that attach to open
criminal trials would apply here as well-"community catharsis,"'14
effect on the outcome, and public education about social and legal
norms. But the courts have seen that confidentiality and privacy are
precisely the interests that motivate some parties to use particular
ADR techniques. For example, in Cincinnati Gas, the settlement was
only possible because the protective order (agreed upon by the parties)
made much of the discovery and information revealed in the summary
35
jury trial confidential.
125. 854 F.2d. 900 (6th Cir. 1988) (involving questions about the design and construction of
a nuclear power plant).
126. Id. at 902.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 903-04.
129. Id. at 902.
130. Id. at 904.
131. Id. (quoting Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984)).
132. Id. at 905.
133. Id.
134. See generally Comment, Summary Jury Trials: Should the Public Have Access?, 16
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1069 (1989).
135. 854 F.2d at 901.
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Thus, one of the primary values of ADR-confidentiality-is
clearly implicated when ADR techniques are used in public spaces.
Does the fact that the summary jury trial uses public facilities-the
courtroom, the jury venire, judicial and clerk time-change the nature
of the proceeding? As some commentators have noted, it is too facile
to compare the summary jury trial to either a full trial or a private
negotiation process: it is a hybrid and has elements of both. Thus,
Laura Nader's concern that we would never have learned about the
defects of the Pinto if the first case had been resolved in a private
summary jury trial 13 6 requires us to consider which cases should settle
and how. Our legal system encourages private settlements. With a
party-initiative adversary system, the parties can choose to take the
case out of the system at any time. 3 7 When settlement structures become "mandatory" and take place in our public judicial system, however, the issues become more complex.
The cases may be distinguished when the parties desire both privacy
and confidentiality but some third party seeks "publication," as in
Cincinnati Gas. If the parties agree, the question is whether public
facilities should be used to facilitate private settlements, especially if
there is a demonstrated interest on the part of at least some of the
public to know what is transpiring. If the parties want to keep their
dispute private, and assuming they can both afford the costs, they can
choose one of the private dispute resolution mechanisms. Preferences
about privacy and confidentiality may change over the course of the
dispute, however, and some disputants may need the force of the public dispute system to get the attention of the other side.' 38 Our system
currently grants privacy within full court adjudication in a number of

136. See DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES, supra note 41, at 129-131 (comments of Nader and
Claybrook). See also debates about new legislation prohibiting the sealing of court records of
both discovery and settlement documents, N.Y. Times, March 3, 1991, at E6, col. I (describing
new statutes in Florida, Texas, New Jersey, and New York that seek to prohibit secret settlements in certain types of cases).
137. Some have argued that cases, especially class actions with implications for more than
the named plaintiffs, can be settled too easily and should be subject to more searching inquiry by
judges. See generally Cooper-Alexander, supra note 37; Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 43; Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L.REv. 308 (1985). We could also ask whether
there are types of cases or particular clients who should not be able to settle-for example,
clients involved in termination of parental rights hearings, or those with so little economic, mental, or political power that we can never be sure they have fully consented to settlement. See,
e.g., Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (rejecting contention of indigent
parent convicted of second-degree murder who argued that due process clause required counsel
to be provided for her in procedure to terminate her parental rights on grounds of willful neglect).
138. See generally Felstiner, Sarat & Abel, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming, Claiming.. ., 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 631 (1980-81).
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types of legal disputes, such as child abuse, some juvenile criminal
proceedings, and some family law matters.
A different problem develops when one party desires publicity and
the other seeks to keep the proceedings confidential.3 9 In this area,
the mandatory requirements of ADR interact with the desires for privacy or confidentiality. If parties can be ordered to participate in summary jury trials, court-compelled arbitrations,' 40 or early neutral
evaluations, 4' they can be foreclosed from a public disposition of
their case. 142 The facile answer usually given to this criticism is that no
party is required to settle in such proceedings, and the party can always insist on a right to jury trial. Others believe that the best way to
deal with this problem is to acknowledge the use of public facilities
and to open these mandatory processes to the public, even at the expense of some parties choosing not to elect such proceedings. 43
Others have suggested that if processes are private, at least the final
outcomes or settlements should be made public in order to analyze the
problems of aggregate or repetitive claims in our society.'" Others,
including myself, have suggested that if we are to evaluate the quality
of the processes being used to facilitate settlements, we must also have
some public scrutiny of the processes being employed, especially when
they are employed in the courts. This in turn, leads to problematic
distinctions to be drawn within the courts. If summary jury trials use
public courtrooms and public funds, should mandatory settlement
conferences held in chambers of judges or magistrates be "open" or
at least recorded for some public scrutiny? To suggest that all settlement functions should be conducted in public is likely to greatly diminish the use of techniques and devices that often promote
settlement. 145
The one certainty in this difficult area is that we cannot make decisions about the appropriateness of public access to proceedings simply
on the basis of the simplistic categories used by the court in Cincinnati
139. This was the problem in Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. Il1. 1987).
140. Congress recently authorized more federal district courts to mandate arbitration. 28
U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1988).
141. See generally Brazil, Kahn, Newman & Gold, Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental Effort to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 69 JUDICATURE 279 (1986).
142. This is particularly true since some of these proceedings do not occur in public courtrooms, but in private law offices.
143. See generally Rickey, Rule 16: A Survey and Some Considerations For the Bench and
Bar, 126 F.R.D. 599 (1989).
144. See DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES, supra note 41, at 125-34. Some states are beginning
to mandate such outcome disclosure, as well as permit public access to litigation documents.
N.Y. Times, supra note 136.
145. An example is the caucusing frequently conducted by federal judges and magistrates in
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Gas.'4 Summary jury trials are engaged in to promote settlement, but
they also use the forms and facilities of public trials. Similarly, public
and private distinctions will not always be easy to make as disputes
4
that appear to be private actually involve important public interests.

1

More on-going analysis of the underlying public policies, perhaps on a
case-by-case basis, will be necessary before we can reach tidy solutions
to this important issue.
A recent case decided in Florida, News-Press Publishing Co. v. Lee

County,"8 further illuminates the potential complexities of simplistic
categorization. In a state court proceeding involving several local government entities over the siting of a proposed bridge, the trial judge
ordered the parties to mediate. 49 The judge further required the parties to bring a representative with full authority to settle the dispute to
the mediation.3 0 A local newspaper filed a motion to open the closed
mediation on the grounds that Florida's Sunshine Law' 5 ' required that
meetings of local governmental entities be open to the public., 2 The
parties to the mediation argued that Florida's mediation statute guaranteed confidentiality to the parties-a common provision of most
mediation statutes."13 The judge agreed and denied the motion to open
the mediation proceeding."14 Further, the judge amended his earlier
order to no longer require government representatives (only their
counsel) to be present, and he suggested that no final settlement
needed to be reached at the mediation meeting, thereby obviating the

settlement conferences. See generally D. M.

PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DisTRICT JUDGES (Federal Judicial Center No. FJC-R-86-1, 1986); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6;

Wall & Rude, Judicial Mediation of Settlement Negotiations, in MEDATION RESEARCH 190 (K.
Kressel & D. Pruitt 1989).
146. See supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
147. Some of these interests include waste siting, toxic torts, environmental issues, product
safety, nuclear power, and civil rights. Adams, supra note 1, at 78. A new Florida statute prohibits any court order or agreement that has the purpose of concealing a "public hazard." FLA.
STAT. § 69.081 (1990 Supp.).
148. 570 So. 2d 1325 (1990).
149. Id. at 1326. The judge relied upon legal authority permitting mandatory mediation in
Florida. Id.
150. Id.
151. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1989).
152. News Press Publishing, 570 So. 2d at 1326.
153. Id. This single case encompasses all of the multiple issues presented by the principal
federal cases under discussion here: the issue of mandating settlement processes raised in Strandell, the issue of compulsory attendance raised in Heileman, and the issue of allowing public
access to the settlement proceeding raised in Cincinnati Gas. The case illustrates both the blurred
boundaries of the law, and the ability of the common law system to generate new situations to
test the limits of overlapping and sometimes conflicting legal policies.
154. News Press Publishing, 570 So. 2d at 1326.
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requirements of the Sunshine Law.' Undoubtedly, other state courts
will also deal with these issues as the states enact compulsory or optional mediation statutes providing for confidentiality in legal environments. Thus, public disputes, or disputes within or among
governments, will likely raise issues about public access to disputing
processes that may make it impossible to finesse the conflicting claims
as the judge in News-Press PublishingCo. was able to do.
C.

The Constitutionalityof ADR

Public access and first amendment issues are only a few of the constitutional challenges that have been leveled against ADR. Invoking a
first amendment claim, both litigants and the public may seek to open
settlement processes that were designed to permit confidential and
open exploration of options and possibilities for settlement.
I will not pursue in great detail the claims about the constitutionality of ADR because they have been well canvassed by others.5 6 As
ADR proceeds in its various forms through the courts, advocates have
raised issues about violations of the right to jury trial, 5 7 due process, 18 equal protection,'59 and separation of powers.160 Most of these
claims have failed, and it is clear that with certain protections like
nonbinding results, rights to de novo hearings, and limited penalties,' 6' ADR can constitutionally be conducted in the courts. Thus, in

155. Id. The appellate court allowed the trial judge's order to stand, holding "that the narrow scope of the mediation proceedings ... does not give rise to a substantial delegation affecting the decision-making function of any ...

agency ...

to require that this mediation

proceeding be open to the public." Id. at 1327.
156. See generally Brazil, supra note 7; Golann, supra note 76.
157. These objections are generally not sustained as long as procedures without juries at
common law are not binding and there is a right to a de novo hearing. See, e.g., Rhea v. MasseyFerguson, 767 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a local rule requiring mediation of cases of
a certain monetary amount was not a violation of the right to jury trial but simply an additional
step between jury demand and trial).
158. This concern is not relevant if alternative procedures are not binding.
159. This concern is apparent in the creation and treatment of different classes of litigation.
Michigan, for example, excludes constitutional cases from its mandatory mediation system.
Most state and federal courts use dollar amounts to allocate civil cases for mediation or arbitration, whether mandatory, voluntary, binding, or nonbinding.
160. The separation of powers concern involves the misdelegation of judicial functions to
others, either non-Article III judges (magistrates), see generally Serron, Magistrates and the
Work of Federal Courts: A New Division of Labor, 69 JUDiCATURE 353 (1986); Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferationof the Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131
(1989), or lawyers as special masters, see generally Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases:
Extending the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 394 (1986), or lawyers
in mediation and arbitration schemes.
161. In the constitutional arena, the most successful attacks have been waged against a variety of sanctions and fee shifting attempts to "punish" a litigant who goes to trial after rejecting
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the constitutional arena the key issue is how the particular ADR programs are structured. Nonbinding settlement devices have virtually all
been sustained against constitutional challenges. Binding procedures,
or those that tax too greatly the choice of process (such as cost or feeshifting penalties), are likely to be more problematic. Constitutional
challenges are not likely to eliminate or abolish ADR in the courts,
though they may have some role in shaping the particular forms that
are used.
More interesting to consider and watch are the myriad of legal
claims that will now be developed by adversarial advocates forced to
seek peace and settlement. As the use of ADR in the courts increases,
cases are beginning to filter up to the appellate courts challenging such
things as discovery rights, failure to fully participate, or the use of
ADR as a "second chance" on the merits. 62 Other challenges involve
rights of confrontation and cross-examination, adequate notice, judicial interference or bias, and lack of neutrality on the part of third
party neutrals. Courts will soon have to grapple with the manipulative
a result from a settlement effort. Michigan's mediation system punishes a plaintiff who fails to
do 10% better at trial than in the mediation by three lawyers. Tiedel v. Northwestern Michigan
College, 865 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1988).
162. For example, see Dorsey v. Nationwide General Insurance Co., No. 102493 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 9, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allstates library) in which plaintiff filed an uninsured motorist
claim against his insurance company. The defendant Nationwide filed an answer, alleging as an
affirmative defense that the claim was subject to mandatory contractual arbitration. Id. Two
years later, after trial preparation, Nationwide sent plaintiff a notice of intention to arbitrate.
Id. The court held that Nationwide was estopped from applying the arbitration clause because it
had allowed the litigation to go on for two years, thereby benefiting from discovery that it knew
was unavailable in arbitration. Id. Defendant moved late for arbitration in large part because it
was afraid of losing on the merits.
In another case, Kupstis v. Michaud, 20 Conn. App. 425, 567 A.2d 1253 (1989), plaintiff
brought an action for specific performance of a real estate sales agreement. The case was referred to a referee at the consent of the parties. Id. at 1253. The referee took longer than the 120
days required by statute for issuing a report and decision, so plaintiff moved to compel the
report. Id. at 1254. When the report was unfavorable to the plaintiff, plaintiff appealed, arguing
that the trial court had violated his due process rights by accepting a report that was not timely
filed. Id. The appellate court rejected this argument. Id.
In Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397 (Iowa 1989), a creditor was required by statute to participate in debt mediation before going to trial. Id. at 398. The creditor's participation at the
mediation consisted of an attorney attending and expressing the creditor's hostility to the debtors, mediator, and the mediation process. Id. The mediator refused to issue the release for trial,
and the court ordered a writ of mandamus stating that participation at one meeting was all the
statute required. Id. at 399.
In contrast, the federal district court in In Re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Airport, 720 F.
Supp. 1433 (D. Colo. 1988), ordered the parties and counsel in multi-district litigation to attend
settlement meetings in the office of plaintiff's counsel. Id. at 1435. Further, against defendant's
objection, the judge ordered them to bargain in good faith with the possibility of sanctions being
ordered for failure to participate. Id. at 1438-39. The court relied on its inherent powers to
manage litigation and foster settlement under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 1437.
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uses of ADR-scheduling a summary jury trial or arbitration just to
hear the other side's case for preparation of rebuttal or simply to inject a little delay into the case.
As advocates have grabbed hold of ADR, they have transformed it
into another arena of battle. The interesting question is what are the
implications of this "capture" of ADR by the courts and its advocates?
IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LEGALIZATION AND
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF

ADR

For those of us who have sought to improve the quality of justice
by changing orientations of lawyers and parties about how to solve
legal problems, the use of new forms of dispute resolution within the
courts has been a mixed blessing. Some of the forms are not so new.
Arbitration has been used in court-annexed programs in one form or
another since the 1950s. 63 Settlement conferences with judges have
been occurring since judges began conducting pretrial conferences under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 64 Various forms
of mediation, neutral case evaluation, and summary jury trials are
newer forms which aim to involve the courts in promoting settlement.
Another development not reviewed here includes "settlement weeks"
in which courts terminate their trial operations for a limited period of
time so that all court personnel and volunteer attorneys may devote
themselves to facilitating settlement of cases.165
The use of settlement activity in the courts should be understood as
the clash of two cultures. To the extent that settlement activity seeks
to promote consensual agreement through the analysis of the point of
view of the other side, 66 it requires some different skills and a very
different mind-set from what litigators usually employ. 167 Thus, the

163. Philadelphia introduced court-referred arbitration in its civil courts in 1952. Hensler,
supra note 33, at 271. In 1978, after about half of the state court systems experimented with
some form of arbitration or similar process; the federal courts began experimenting with arbitration using several districts as demonstration projects. Most arbitration programs attached to
courts are nonvoluntary, but not binding.
164. See generally Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69
JUDICATURE 257 (1986); Kritzer, The Judge's Role in Pre-Trial Case Processing: Assessing the
Need for Change, 66 JUDICATURE 34 (1982).
165. This is done in an effort to reduce case backlog. Middleton, Settlement Weeks Gain
Favor Around U.S., 9 NAT'L L.J. A-1, cols. 1-2 (Jan. 12, 1987).
166. Other values that are enhanced by good settlement processes and outcomes include information sharing, choices of solutions or remedies that may be beyond what courts would be
empowered to order, consideration of the future as well as the past, and resolution of social,
economic, psychological, political, moral, and legal issues. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra
note I. Others have also specified these values as being enhanced through the process. See gener-
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issue is whether judges and lawyers in the courts can learn to reorient
their cultures and behaviors when trying to settle cases or whether
those seeking settlement continue to do so from an adversarial perspective. 16 To the extent that we cannot identify different behaviors in
each sphere, we may see the corruption of both processes. If one of
the purposes of the legal system is to specify legal entitlements from
which settlements may be measured, or from which the parties may
depart if they so choose, then having adjudicators engage in too much
mediative conduct may compromise the ability of judges to engage in
both fact-finding and rulemaking.l6 9 If courts fail to provide sufficient
baselines in their judgments, we will have difficulties determining if
particular settlements are wise or truly consensual. There is danger in
the possibility that good settlement practice will be marred by overzealous advocacy or by over-zealous desire to close cases that may require either full adjudication or a public hearing.

ally D. LAx & J. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR (1986); R. FISHER & W. URY, supra
note 21; H. RAnFA, supra note 22; L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PiJmLIC DISPUTES (1987).
167. I use the term "litigator," rather than "trial lawyer," to reflect the fact that most lawyers engaged in litigation spend much more of their time in preparation for trials (depositions,
motions, and so forth) than in actual trials, see generally McMunigal, supra note 7, although I
believe that most lawyers' mind-sets when pursuing litigation tactics and strategies are based on
the assumptions of trial practice, see generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1.
My own experience with the difference of perspectives required to engage in this function, and
the conflicting results, has led me to stop teaching students to be wise negotiators and strong
trial advocates at the same time. I think, however, that I was able to do both when I was in
practice. I am not alone in this dilemma. See generally Hyman, Trial Advocacy and Methods of
Negotiation: Can Good Trial Advocates Be Wise Negotiators?, 34 UCLA L. REV. 863 (1987).
Given these conflicting cultures, some have suggested separate specialties in negotiation and dispute resolution. See generally Fisher, What About Negotiation As A Speciality?, 69 A.B.A. J.
1221 (1983).
168. Actually, what we really need is more rigorous analysis of actual lawyer behavior, both
in the courtroom and in settlement activity. There are very few studies of lawyers actually negotiating; most are based on post-hoc reports of negotiation behavior. See generally H. L. Ross,
SETTLED OUT OF COURT (2d ed. 1980); G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION

AND SETTLEMENT

(1982); Melli, Erlanger & Chambliss, The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation
in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133 (1988). See also H. KRITZER,
LET'S MAKE A DEAL: NEGOTIATION OF CIVIL CASES (1991) (analysis of CLRP data on settlements
from court records and attorney interviews); H. GENN, HARD BARGAINING: OUT OF COURT SETTLEMENT IN PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS (1988) (study of insurance and worker's comp negotiations in England); Jonathan Hyman, Rutgers Center for Negotiation and Conflict Resolution,
Study of Lawyer and Judge Civil Settlement Methods, (Draft Questionnaire, 1990). Most of
these studies have found relatively low intensity of activity with conventional, demand-offer,
split-the-difference patterns of negotiation.
169. My colleague Stephen Yeazell labels this "market discipline." Under this view, the best
that judges can do to promote good settlements is to adjudicate as many cases as possible to
make clear the alternative to consensual agreement. In negotiation parlance, judges should make
clear what the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) at trial will be. R. FISHER &
W. URY, supra note 21, at 101-11.
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Below I review some of the dilemmas presented by the clash of
these cultures-settlement in an adversary culture-and suggest some
ideas for consideration and small reforms for adoption. I do not see
easy or facile answers to these dilemmas. I do not think we will develop a magic taxonomy of case types 70 that will permit easy allocation of cases to one form of processing or another in part because of
the dynamism of the legal system and its actors. Some cases may
change in the course of attempted resolution and some lawyers,
judges, and parties may develop new ideas and behavioral repertoires
during the course of litigation in particular cases.' 7' We can continue
to monitor the uses to which settlement is put within the court system
and to develop some measures, controls, and standards for evaluating
whether we are achieving what we want. 72 Innovations in dispute resolution give us an opportunity to explore the limits of our preferences
and conceptions about the proper roles of dispute resolvers. At the
same time, the use of alternatives to adjudication within the court system raises new issues where the two cultures begin to blur.
A. The "Colonization" of Alternatives by ConventionalAdvocates
As Marguerite Millhauser has written, there is an unspoken resistance to alternative dispute resolution 73 that derives in part from the
170. Those types that have been suggested include number of issues, number of parties,
amount at issue, public impact of case, need for privacy and secrecy, test case impact, legal
versus factual disputes, stage of case, time pressures for resolution and relief sought (adjudication, fact-finding, report, changed behavior required, speed, principled ruling, underlying problems dealt with), relationship desired (on-going, short-term, power imbalances, lawyer-client
relations), and process desired (collaborative, advisory, adversary, investigative, fact-finding,
predicting court outcome).
In my view, these factors are so numerous and potentially contradictory for each party that
any attempt to create a matrix of allocation will likely need at least several dimensions and is not
likely to form a predictive model that will suggest in which category a particular case belongs.
On the other hand, these attempts at specifying factors may be very helpful for parties to consider as they choose which processes might be desirable in particular cases. See generally C.
MENKEL-MEADOW & B. MOULTON, Who Decides: Lawyer and Client Decisionmaking About
Dispute Resolution in BEYOND THE ADVERSARY MODEL: MATERIALS AND CASES ON NEGOTIATION
AND MEDIATION (forthcoming) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, Tallahassee,
Fla.).
171. This rather optimistic-some would say naive-view is based on my own experience as a
litigator, mediator, and teacher. Again, I am not alone in these views. David Luban and Baruch
Bush have labeled this view the "transformation" goal of quality dispute resolution. Bush, supra
note 7, at 1;Luban, supra note 7, at 401.
172. I think what we want is enormously problematic. From the literature reviewed in this
Article alone, we can see there is little agreement among scholars, judges, and practitioners
about what values our legal system is supposed to serve. For some, quick case processing is
justice; for others, settlements that do not track the legal entitlements of the parties are not just;
and, for still others, legal victories that cannot be enforced are not useful. These are not new
value differences among those who aim to create a fair and just legal system. Innovations in
dispute resolution have just revived and brought to the fore many of the older disputes about the
relationship between procedural and substantive justice.
173. See generally Millhauser, The Unspoken Resistance to Alternative Dispute Resolution, 3
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tendency instilled by our adversarial training'7 4 to distrust alternative
forms of consciousness, such as a focus on solving the problem rather
than winning the case. Some of this can be seen in the somewhat conflicting case law developments alluded to above. Some are settlementpromoting, 17 while others are concerned about the limits of forcing
76
settlement and our right to proceed adversarily to trial if we want.'
But as these cases travel through the courts, it is clear that lawyers are
approaching settlement adversarily. They are ready to raise legal,
technical, and procedural claims about how cases are being processed,
and they are questioning whether settlement comes at the expense of
other legal entitlements.
Similarly, there is some evidence that at least some lawyers persist
in appearing at various ADR sessions wearing their adversarial
suits.? 77 A recent professional workshop on alternative dispute resolution was titled "How to 'Win' at ADR. ' ' 78 The Michigan courts have
"co-opted" the language of ADR by calling their case processing pro-

NEfoTITON J. 29 (1987); Millhauser, Gladiators and Conciliators-ADR: A Law Firm Staple,
B. LEADER 20 (Sept.-Oct. 1988).

174. See generally Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of
Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFFALO L. REv.
487 (1980); Stempel, All Stressed Up but Not Sure Where to Go: Pondering the Teaching of
Adversarialism in Law School, 55 BROOKLYN L. REv. 165 (1989). See Alleyne, Delawyerizing
Labor Arbitration, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 93 (1989), for an argument that lawyers have "infected"
the labor arbitration process with too many unproductive adversarial formalisms that inhibit the
goals of flexible and informal labor arbitration. These formalisms include evidentiary objections, formal procedural rules, and delay. Id. at 94-97. See also Bundy & Elhauge, Do Lawyers
Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation and its Regulation, 79 CALI. L.
REv. 315 (1991).
175. Examples are the confidentiality ruling in Cincinnati Gas, and the ordering of parties to
attend mandatory settlement conferences in Heileman. See generally Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Foregoing the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. REv. LAw & Soc. CHANGE 575 (1986) (criticizing some of
the other settlement promoting devices, such as sanctions and penalties for not accepting settlement offers).
176. An example is Strandell; see also Tiedel v. Northwestern Michigan College, 865 F.2d 88
(6th Cir. 1988).
177. Suits can, of course, be worn by both male and female attorneys. I raise the issue here,
however, to consider whether approaches to case resolution may have some gender component.

See generally D.

TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION

(1990); Menkel-Meadow, Portia In A Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's Lawyering
Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 32 (1985); Kolb & Coolidge, Her Place at the Table: A
Consideration of Gender Issues in Negotiation (Harvard Law School Program on Negotiation,
Working Paper Series No. 88-5, Oct. 1988) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives,
Tallahassee, Fla.).
178. 7 ALTERNATIVES 73 (Apr. 1989). Of course, winning could include "win-win" solutions,
but the appeal is to conventional adversarial conceptions of winning at negotiation. For typical
examples of how to "win" at negotiation, see generally H. COHEN, You CAN NEGOTIATE ANYTHING (1982); E. LEVIN, NEGOTIATING TACTICS: BARGAIN YOUR WAY TO WINNING (1980); M.
MELTSNER & P. SCHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST ADVOCACY 231 (1977). Language use is also instructive. For example, a letter may say "I am filing an ADR against you."
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gram mediation; in fact, it is a hybrid form of case evaluation and
arbitration. 179
To the extent that "qualitative" ADR consists of an opening of
mind and consciousness to formulate a different style or approach to
legal representation, the appearance of litigators at mandatory settlement proceedings may taint the quality of the process that ensues.
Some firms have gone so far as to recognize that dispute resolution
may require different forms of expertise and various personality
types. Such firms have developed specialized departments, while others have instituted programs to teach traditional lawyers to conceive
of their dispute resolution processes differently. The use of ADR may
require some skills other than advocacy. s0 For lawyers and judges
who have been taught to argue, criticize, and persuade, rather than to
listen, synthesize, and empathize, some changes in behavior will be
necessary.'' Adversarial practices may be problematic in settlement
not only because of the obvious risk of stalemate and hostility, but
also because extreme positions most often produce unprincipled compromise even if a settlement agreement is reached. 8 2 This confirms the
criticisms of those who see settlement as an unprincipled process. 83
Good settlement practice may be difficult to adapt to traditional adversarial forms.1'4
B.

The Difficulties of Cross-Dialogue- The Actors
In an important sense, the ADR movement represents a case study
in the difficulties of legal reform when undertaken by different groups
within the legal system. At the beginning were the conceptualizers-

179. See generally K. SUART, supra note 33.
180. Some of these skills include different communication skills, the ability to listen, creativity, different forms of analysis and synthesis, and an ability to think outside of legal paradigms.
181. These changes may also be limited by the usual constraints of behavior modification.
See generally D. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR (1982); D. PRUITT & J. RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT, ESCALATION, STALEMATE AND SETTLEMENT (1986); J. RUBIN & B. BROWN, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION (1975); Menkel-Meadow, Coming of Age: A DR
in a Persistent Adversary System, 1991 NIDR FORUM II (Winter); D. Koehler, Persistence of
Conflicting Views (Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation, Working Paper No. 10, May,
1990); R. Robinson, D. Keltner & L. Ross, Misconstruing the Views of the "Other" Side: Real
and Perceived Differences in Three Ideological Conflicts, (Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation, Working Paper No. 18, May, 1990).
182. See generally H. RAIFFA, supra note 22.
183. See generally supra note 7.
184. Robert Axelrod's work on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is instructive for its
possible adaptation to various issues in law practice (discovery strategy, information bargaining,
negotiation behavior). R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 28 (1984). The most robust program in repeat plays was "TIT FOR TAT." Id. at 31. This program was "nice, retaliatory, forgiving and clear." Id. at 54. Thus, good settlement involves both firmness, analytic
acuity, some altruism and reciprocity, at least in repeat plays.
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academics" 5 and judicial activists'8 6 who developed both the critique
of the adversary system and, in some cases, the design of alternative
systems of dispute resolution. The implementers developed the concrete forms these innovations took when they moved into the legal
system. Some of the conceptualizers-FrankSander and several of the
judges-were also implementers. In addition, other judges and judicial administrators principally concerned about case load management, and about the quality of solutions or decisions, became
implementers. Support for the implementation of these ADR programs came from the principal foundation and government funding
sources," 7 as well as from groups of change-oriented practicing lawyers who played an important catalytic role in supporting and using
8
some of the first alternative procedures.
Finally, the constituents of these ADR systems-lawyers and their
clients as consumers-were "acted upon," sometimes somewhat consensually, by the force of court rules or judicial encouragement. We
are just beginning to see some of their reactions in the litigation developing from ADR innovation and in evaluation research.8 9

185. In many respects, Frank Sander's article, The Varieties of Dispute Processing, initiated
many of the alternative dispute resolution innovations within courts. See generally Sander, supra
note 7. One such innovation is the "multi-door courthouse" idea, which contemplates a choice
of dispute resolution processes for litigants who reach the courthouse doors. Id. at 130-31. This
concept is currently being tested in several jurisdictions. See generally S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN &
F. SANDER, supra note 2. While he was in practice, Eric Green was one of the conceptualizers of
the mini-trial. See generally Green, Marks & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation: An Alternative Approach, I I Loy. L.A.L. REV. 493 (1978). Steven Goldberg, a labor arbitrator, publicized
the hybrid form of "med-arb" (mediation-arbitration) in some dispute processing. See generally
Goldberg, The Mediation of Grievances Under a Collective Bargaining Contract, 77 Nw. U.L.
REV. 270 (1982). See also R. FISHER & W. URY, supra note 21; McGovern, Toward A Functional
Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1986); Riskin, supra note
7.
186. Examples of these judicial activists include Judge Thomas Lambros of the Northern
District of Ohio, see generally Lambros, supra note 61, Judge Robert Peckham of the Northern
District of California, see generally Peckham, The Federal Judge As Case Manager: The New
Role in Guiding A Case From Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770 (1981), Judge Richard Enslen of the Western District of Michigan, see generally Enslen, Michigan Mediation, in
ADR AND THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS (E. Fine ed. 1987), and Magistrate
Wayne Brazil of the Northern District of California (former law professor at Hastings College of
Law), see generally Brazil, supra note 1; Brazil, supra note 7. For a discussion of the early
neutral evaluation program in Judge Peckham's court, see generally Brazil, supra note 7.
187. These sources include NIDR, CPR, and the State Justice Institute.
188. The lawyers in this group include, among others, Robert S. Banks, Vice President and
General Counsel at Xerox; Robert Gorske, Vice President and General Counsel at Wisconsin
Electric & Power; Charles Renfrew, General Counsel at Chevron; Kenneth Feinberg of Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman & Hays; Ronald Olson, of Munger, Tolles & Rickerhauser; Walter Kocher,
Vice-President and General Counsel at Borden Company. See generally DONOVAN, LEISURE,
NEWTON & IRVINE ADR PRACTICE BOOK (J. Wilkinson ed. 1990).
189. See generally E.A. LIND, R. MACCOUN, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, D. HENSLER, J.
RESNIK & T. TYLER, supra note 33; Esser, supra note 7.
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Each of these groups of actors within the ADR legal reform movement inhabit different cultural worlds-academia, the judiciary, law
practice, the business world, and everyday life. Each group uses,
transforms, and "colonizes" the work of the others. The research of
academics is ignored or simplified; judges move cases along and adopt
the language of case management rather than justice; lawyers "infect" clients with a desire for adversarial advantage, or in other cases
clients do the same to lawyers; and professionals argue about credentialing and standards for the new profession.'90
Each of these actors in the dispute resolution arena may be serving
different masters. As the ideas are institutionalized, they develop into
new and different forms of dealing with problems. 1 91 Those who work
in the field have attempted to create environments for dialogues
among and between these constituencies.192 Some of these meetings
have been productive and have fostered "cross-class" understanding.
Just as often, however, such meetings leave people confirmed in their
views that their particular paradigm is most accurate. Others do not
understand the particular reality that some may face-whether it be
the crush of caseloads or the lack of "justice" in settlements.
In my view, productive discourse about ADR will have to transcend
the language of these cultural differences. Academics, and particularly
those who theorize about jurisprudential concerns, need to root their
views in the practicalities of our empirical world. 93 Occasionally,
judges and legal practitioners need to step back and review the larger
jurisprudential and policy issues implicated in "quick-fix" reforms.
Practitioners and clients need to consider new forms of practice and
process while diminishing their adversarial ways of thinking. A professional life should be one of re-examination, growth, and change. If

190. See generally Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution Commission on Qualifications, Issues Paper (Sept. 1988) (unpublished draft) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of
Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
191. For example, the summary jury trial in the courts is a hybrid of the mini-trial, which
was first developed for private dispute resolution. Mediation in the private sector has been
adopted in court settlement usage and is mandated by statute for some forms of action. See,
e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1990) (mandating child custody mediation).
192. For example, the Wisconsin Institute for Legal Studies Disputes Processing Research
Program sponsored a conference on the quality of dispute resolution which brought these constituencies together. The "academic" outcomes of this conference are published in Quality of
Dispute Resolution, supra note 7. The Center for Public Resources' annual meetings often use
panels designed to foster such "cross-class" dialogue, and conferences sponsored by NIDR and
SPIDR also attempt to bring together theoreticians, researchers, practitioners, and judicial officers.
193. For my views about the importance of empirical study in legal scholarship, see generally
Menkel-Meadow, Durkheimian Epiphanies: The Importance of Engaged Social Science in Legal
Studies, 18 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 91 (1990).
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we are really looking for new ways to process disputes-both to increase case-processing efficiency and to promote better quality solutions-then we have to be willing to look critically at the innovations
and their effects from all quarters. I believe that social innovation and
transformation are possible here-the issues are whether conventional
mind-sets will "infect" these innovations on the one hand, or whether
the "cure" will be worse than the disease on the other.
C. Issues, Proposals,and Reforms for Innovation and Evaluation of
ADR in the Courts
In a sense, we are at a second stage in the development of alternative dispute resolution innovations. The bloom on the rose has faded
as some experiments have been tried and now present their own problems or dilemmas. Some of us still aim for consciousness transformation and creative solutions to problems; others are more focused on
the institutionalized forms of ADR and what can be done to make
them work. Many of the issues raised by these developments require
policy judgments for which we have an inadequate empirical data
base; others require us to make normative choices based on what we
value in a procedural system. If ADR is to meet the basic levels of
fairness, then the following questions must be addressed, and the following data must be collected to prevent ADR from becoming totally
swallowed by the adversarial system:
1. To what extent will courts lose their legitimacy as courts if too
many other forms of case-processing are performed within their
walls? 94 If the "other" processes are not considered legitimate within
public institutions, they will be legally challenged and transformed so
that they will no longer be "alternatives," but only watered-down versions of court adjudication. These watered-down versions may be violative of the legal rights and rules our courts are intended to
safeguard. Are theorists, practitioners, and citizens capable of changing our views of what courts should do?' 9
2. Should some case types be excluded from alternative treatment? 196

194. Our conception of the court as the central dispute-resolver is socially constructed and
culturally based. As Martin Shapiro has argued, one can see courts as performing a specialized
form of dispute resolution where adjudication is seen as a sub-category of mediation. See generally M. SHAPnto, supra note 10.
195. Courts have always done more than "adjudication." See generally Schwartz, The Other
Things That Courts Do, 28 UCLA L. REV. 438 (1981).
196. For example, some commentators suggest that Strandell stands alone in its condemnation of the summary jury trial because it was a civil rights case with a potential power imbalance
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3. What are the purposes for using particular forms of alternative
dispute resolution? Caseload management and docket reduction may
suggest entirely different processes than a search for a better quality
solution 97 which might be quite costly and time-consuming. If the
goals and purposes of particular ADR institutions are clarified now,
future problems based on overly abstract goals may be avoided.
4. What forms of ADR should be institutionalized? Not all ADR
devices are the same. There is a tendency in the literature and in the
rhetoric to homogenize widely different approaches to dispute resolution. A more thorough and careful consideration of each of the devices might lead to different conclusions about the utility and
legitimacy of these devices. Mandatory settlement conferences, for example, may become quite acceptable if the judicial officer attending
the conference will not also be ruling on the evidence at trial. 98 Similarly, we might feel differently about summary jury trials if they were
as accessible to the public as any other activity conducted in open
court and if jurors were told about what they were doing. These distinctions implicate all of the legal policy issues in drafting the rules of
procedure. How much regulation of each process should there be?
How clear should the rules be before parties can elect different processes or before they can be "ordered" to attend? How should Rules
16, 39, 68, and 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be read or
amended to reflect the changes in settlement policy? ' " What values
should these rules serve? By what standards should practices under
these rules be evaluated?

2

00

in legal resources. I am, however, skeptical of such efforts. When there are identified victims
who need recompense, even some civil rights actions may be appropriate for settlement. But we
may have to allow one or both of the parties to opt out of a process if court adjudication is
desired by them. Thus, I am in favor of mandatory processes that require litigants to try a
settlement process, but I would permit easy exit.
The irony of Strandell is that the plaintiff's possession of the names and statements of the
witnesses provided plaintiff with a legal advantage. The difficult question posed by Strandell is
whether the correction of legal resource imbalance with the better advocacy by the plaintiff's
lawyer should be preserved until trial. I have trouble with this notion because our discovery
system is intended to put an end to some modern forms of trial by surprise.
197. When mandatory child custody mediations average only three or four hours, or can be
resolved in just a few sessions, we may question whether a "quality" solution is being produced.
198. We know from the empirical work of Wayne Brazil that mandatory settlement conferences, when conducted appropriately, are highly desired by many attorneys. Brazil, Settling Civil
Cases: What Lawyers Want From Judges, 23 JUoGE's J. 14, 16 (Summer 1984).
199. See generally Guill & Slavin, supra note 7. This raises the difficult question of whether
the rules should structure these innovations in advance, or whether flexible rules should permit
wide experimentation for rule modification after experience and evaluation.
200. By "standards," I mean both social science standards for evaluating efficiency and efficacy and legal standards such as "abuse of discretion" in the use of a particular practice.
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5. What are the politics of ADR? Does ADR serve the interests of
particular groups? This is not an easy question to answer. Many have
argued that "minor" disputes have been siphoned out of the public
legal system, while "major" disputes have continued to receive the
benefits of the traditional court system. 20 1 Large corporations are also
removing their cases from the court system. Through their increased
use of private ADR, the economics of dispute resolution are more
subtle. Some may be "forced" out while others choose to opt out.
What will this mean for payment and subsidies of dispute resolution?
Will "free market" forces decide the fate of ADR? Who will control
decision-making about ADR-judges, lawyers, clients, or legislators?
If those with the largest stake in the system exit, who will supply the
impetus and resources for court and rule reform? At the level of institutional decision-making, are these issues for individual judges, for
20 2
the Congress, or for the United States Supreme Court to decide?
6. What are the cultural forces producing these legal changes at
these particular times? Has the larger culture around us changed since
particular legal innovations were adopted? If attempts to incorporate
party participation in disputing were made in the "participatory"
1960s and 1970s, then does the 1980s era of privatization of public
services dictate other considerations in the use of ADR? How has the
rhetoric of quality justice been transformed into a rhetoric of quantity
20 3
and case processing?
7. How are different forms of ADR actually functioning? This is
the evaluation question. We need to know more about how these
processes actually work 2°4 in terms of processes used 25 and outcomes

201. The distinction between "major" and "minor" disputes has generally been defined in
monetary terms.
202. Other than in its recent cases supporting arbitration, see, e.g., Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (Court held that predispute arbitration agreements
are valid for claims under the Securities Exchange Act); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (Court upheld an agreement to arbitrate even though the
claims were antitrust claims), the United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on any of the
relatively new innovations of ADR in the courts. See also a recent Supreme Court ruling that age
discrimination claims could be subjected to compulsory arbitration, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., IIIS. Ct. 1647 (1991).
203. These questions require rigorous study by anthropologists of legal culture.
204. Some current studies, including Marie Provine's study of judicial settlement techniques,
will provide rigorous quantitative and qualitative empirical analyses of how these various forms
of ADR are being used. In the socio-legal framework, studies of ADR practices are part of an
ongoing research project on the transformation of disputing in our society. See generally Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dispute Paradigm Does
and Does Not Tell Us, 2 Mo. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTI ON 25 (1985); special issue on Dispute Processing and Civil Litigation, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 611 (1980-81).
205. Some of these processes include adversarial attitudes, coordination and collaboration,
information exchanges, and power imbalances.
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achieved, 2°* as well as the more common measures of party satisfaction.207
In my view, alternative dispute resolution and the pursuit of settlement in the courts will, and should, continue. The courts will deal
with these issues as they experiment with different formats and as they
continue to rule on the legal issues presented by ADR. In order for
ADR to develop in a way that enhances our trust in the American
legal system, several important reforms should accompany our experimentation.
First, some forms of ADR should remain mandatory, but not binding. At first blush, it is easier to suggest that ADR should be used
only consensuallym to preserve the kind of settlement culture that is
motivated to reach voluntary and consensual agreement without the
"taint" of coercion and unproductive adversarialness. But in my own
experience as both a mediator and a litigator, I have seen many good
settlements emerge through the skilled intervention or facilitation of
the parties by skilled negotiators or third parties, even in cases where
settlement seemed impossible. I still believe in the "transformation"
and education project attributed to me by Baruch Bush and David
Luban.2 In addition, in order to rigorously evaluate some of these
alternative processes, we will have to study them as they are used on a
wide variety of cases without choices about opting in or out.
Second, if some settlement processes are to be made mandatory,
certain essential legal protections may have to flow from those processes. If they do not, then processes may have to be chosen consensually or voluntarily. I would recommend records of proceedingsstenographic proceedings of both summary jury trials and mandatory
settlement conferences-in order to provide a record for appeals or
challenges for "coercive settlement" conduct. Such coercion would violate legal standards of abuse of judicial discretion for those settlement practices involving judicial officers. I would still preserve the
confidentiality of some forms of settlement to facilitate candor. Records should be available to parties in the event of challenges as

206. In an ideal scientific world, we would be able to compare the outcomes of different
processes in the same case. Our legal system cannot financially or constitutionally afford to
create perfect experimental conditions with real cases, so we will have to rely on studies that
come as close as possible. See generally E.A. LIND, R. MAcCouN, P. EBENER, W. FELSrnzrm, D.
HENSLER,

J.

REsNiK

& T.

TYLER,

supra note 33; McEwen & Maiman, supra note 33.

207. We may need to be more methodologically creative, borrowing such systems as peer
review from medical service evaluation.
208. This was my original position.
209. Bush, Defining Standards of Quality in Dispute Resolution: Setting the Stage for Discussion, 66 DEN. U.L. REV. 336, 379 n.85 (1989); Luban, supra note 7, at 413 n.88.
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judges may be called upon to rule about whether particular hearings
should be conducted in camera or opened to the public and whether
documents should be sealed. 210 In all other settlement processes, like
arbitration or mediation led by attorneys, decisions should be nonbinding with right of trial de novo to protect the parties' constitutional rights, and to provide an alternative to an inappropriate
arbitration process.
Third, if settlement processes are to be conducted within the courts,
they should be facilitated by those who will not be the ultimate triers
of fact. Because I believe that good settlement practice frequently depends on the revelation of facts that would be inadmissible in court, 21 1
the facilitator of settlement cannot be the same person who will ultimately find facts or decide the outcome of the case. In some courts
this will mean the use of magistrates, and in others it will mean rotating judges through cases on other dockets.
Fourth, settlement facilitators must be trained to conduct settlement
proceedings, particularly those that depart from conventional adjudication models. 2 2 In its current format, the summary jury trial operates much like a regular trial. Therefore, it requires few skills different
from those we assume judges currently possess. 2 3 Because it uses mediation techniques, a settlement conference draws on other skills and

therefore requires specialized training .214
Fifth, we must provide the evidence for systematic evaluation of alternative dispute resolution devices. To accomplish this goal, I recommend the recording of proceedings, as well as more sophisticated data
collection at the court level. With the advent of computer technology,
it should be possible to create data sets of case treatments that would
permit the kind of systematic analysis necessary to compare outcomes
and processes of greater variety and in greater depth. These data sets
could be supplemented by qualitative research, including party satis2
faction measures .
210. This of course implicates the growing body of law in testing the limits of statutorily
protected confidentiality in mediation proceedings. See N. ROGERS & C. McEWEN, supra note
78, at 95-146; See also Cheh, Civil Lawsuits as Dispute Resoluton or Public Regulation (draft
paper prepared for Rutgers Center For Negotiation and Conflict Resolutions, Feb. 27, 1991).
211. By this I do not mean only those items which would be inadmissible because of evidentiary objections, but also those facts that go to the parties' underlying needs, interests, or objectives that would be totally irrelevant to the legal proceedings. If such facts were presented to the
fact-finder, they might prejudice rulings on evidentiary matters, or even about the final outcome.
212. This point is also related to point number three.
213. Although there usually are no evidentiary rulings made in the summary jury trial, it
operates much like an adversarial presentation with opening and closing statements by the lawyers.
214. This is a view I advance in Menkel-Meadow, supra note 6, at 513-14.
215. See generally the data collection in D. TRUBEK, J. GROSSMAN, W. FELSTINER, H.
KRITZER & A. SARAT, CIvIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT FINAL REPORT (1983).
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Sixth, different forms of ADR should be unbundled and separately
evaluated. Summary jury trials may work best in fact-intensive cases,
or in cases likely to take a great deal of trial time. Evaluation and
consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of summary jury
trial can be distinguished from the pros and cons of mandatory settlement conferences, and from early neutral evaluation and other case
management devices. We must be more precise about what we call
"alternative" and what we label "adjudication." Both of these concepts have become so abstract, undifferentiated, and homogeneous
that we no longer know what is being measured against what.
"Shadow verdicts" may not be the same as "shadow bargains, ' 216
and in order to evaluate these processes, we need to understand the
baseline comparisons. It might be instructive to determine how important it is to parties, as well as scholars, that settlements track legal
217
entitlements.
Finally, categorical judgments about particular processes are likely
to be unhelpful. Mediation or summary jury trials per se do not violate our procedural rules or jurisprudential norms. More often, the
issue is whether a particular process is carried out sensitively or "coercively." Because of the range of human variation in how these proceedings are conducted, it makes more sense at this point to allow
judicial experimentation and legal challenges to be handled in each
case.2 1 Standards, like abuse of discretion, should protect against the
abuses of those who do not adequately protect the parties' rights to
fair process.2 1 9 Furthermore, the amendment process to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides another opportunity for regulation.
I offer these simple suggestions to encourage the flowering of alternatives to expensive and limited court adjudication, while at the same
time seeking to preserve that which characterizes the good in both ad-

216. Luban, supra note 7,at 387.
217. This point may also be very important for scholars. The role of law in negotiation and
mediation is a complex issue. This is true both in terms of normative views-whether law and its
underlying principles should govern the resolution of disputes-and its empirical reality. See
generally Cooper-Alexander, supra note 37. See also G. FIEDMAN, THE ROLE OF LAW IN MEDIATION 286, 298-99 (Center for the Development of Mediation Law 1983). Legal entitlements are
judgments made by legislators and judges about what rules should govern human conduct in.
individual cases and in the aggregate. The issue of when parties should be able to consent to
departures from the law involves both micro-interpersonal level decision-making and macro-level
compliance.
218. This ability to determine each case on its merits represents the strength of our common
law system.
219. Of course, the adoption of a case-by-case abuse of discretion standard may burden
those who cannot afford to appeal. Because a decision about the ADR process may need to be
resolved early, it may be uncorrectable as well as outcome determinative. Therefore, it should be
appealable through writs or interlocutory appeals.
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judication and settlement. Both authoritative rulings and consensual
agreements have their place in our dispute resolution system. These
should be monitored and managed so that they preserve what is good
about each without "infecting" the other. I am as unhappy with "coerced compromises" as settlements as I am with limited adversarial
solutions to polycentric problems2 0
V.

CONCLUSION: WHITHER GOEST

ADR?

Obviously, I am not happy with all of the developments and turns
that ADR has taken. By opposing its mandatory, court-institutionalized forms, I find myself in an awkward position-considered by
some to be an unmitigated apologist for ADR,221 and by others to be
downright hostile to ADR. For me, many of the institutionalized
structures may be useful in encouraging those deeply entrenched in a
particular way of thought to try something new. But my fear is that
we may be pouring old wine (and whines!) into new jugs. Commitment to the kind of sensitive, caring, and quality (Pareto-efficient) solutions that I seek comes from intellect, insight, commitment, and
some volunteerism. While I think it is an open question whether mandatory programs can serve an educational function for those who are
totally ignorant about these new processes, I still think that a certain
consciousness is necessary for the achievement of quality solutions.
Thus, I am somewhat skeptical of some of the ways in which mandatory programs force people to use other processes of dispute resolution that may be subject to distortion within the adversary culture in
which they are placed. This should be a time of experimentation, both
in the public and private sectors. It seems to be somewhat ironic that
the courts are moving into a period of rigid rule making to structure
the very processes that were designed to transform the judicial system
into one more flexible and responsive to the needs of its constituents.
As a teacher of negotiation and methods of dispute resolution, I am
now faced with the task of teaching "the law of ADR," as well as
contributing to the creativity of the negotiation process. I continue to
teach my students to be fish swimming upstream in the river of our
adversarial culture because I believe not all problems should have binary or compromised solutions. I still seek dispute resolution processes that are designed to solve problems, not make them worse.m"As

220. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1.
221. Silbey & Sarat, supra note 7,at 484-96.
222. Just as the medical system can sometimes make illness worse (iatrogenic illness), the
legal system can make our problems worse ("juridogenic" problems). See C. SMART, FEMINISM
AND THE POWER OF LAW 12 (1989).
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a law and society legal realist, however, I see that we must understand
that our innovations do not occur in a vacuum-they are enfolded
into an already existing legal culture. The questions that have brought
me here today2 3 are why the adversary culture is as pervasive as it is in
our legal culture and whether any radical transformation is possible.
All social innovation will have its unintended consequences. The consequences may simply be to see the force of the adversary system as it
pulls against its correctives. If I seem unable to take a definite stand
on one side of the adjudication versus settlement debate, it is because
I am a mediator. In the end, truth is almost always found on both
sides. The key is not to compromise, but to work toward a principled
and fair resolution of the issues.

223. 1 feel somewhat victimized by the forces I describe, as some distort my own arguments
and claims about alternative ways of resolving disputes while at the same time seeking to defend
adjudicative processes. Silbey and Sarat suggest that my model of problem-solving negotiation
emphasizes "needs," not "rights." Silbey & Sarat, supra note 7, at 484-96. But see MenkelMeadow, supra note 1, at 838-40. Catharine MacKinnon sees negotiation as unfeminist for failing to see that women will lose in negotiations with more powerful men. Feminist Discourse,
Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BuFFALo L. REV. 11, 74 (1985). But see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 833-36. Resnik suggests that alternative modes of dispute resolution are overly therapeutic or psychological for resolution of legal issues. Resnik, supra note 3,
at 497. But see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1, at 829-40. The structure of these arguments
shows just how forcefully adversarial, rhetorical styles cause us to see things as "either/or,"
rather than to appreciate the complexity and richness of multi-faceted problems and issues.
These may require more complicated solutions than the "either/or" we seek in the conventional
adjudicatory mode or through adversarial argument.

